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Unformatted text preview: und.” 254 Keith testified that he was concerned about this because he “couldn’t really monitor the volumes in the pits correctly.” 255 Keith also testified that the activities occurring onboard the Deepwater Horizon were not consistent with Transocean’s kick prevention procedures. 256 Nevertheless, at no point prior to the blowout, did Keith issue a stop‐work order because, according to his testimony, he “just didn’t think of it at the time.” 257 Keith testified, however, that the high level of mud‐moving activities should have resulted in a stop‐work order from someone on the rig. 258 Dr. Smith analyzed available data and, in his report, detailed what Keith and the rest of the crew would have observed had they properly monitored the well. Just after 8:00 p.m., an increase of main pit volume by 500 barrels, likely the result of the transfer of seawater into the main pit, precluded the crew from using pit gain as a monitoring tool. According to Dr. Smith, not having this tool available complicated kick detection...
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