Atthetimeoftheblowoutthemajorcomponentsofthelowermarin

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Unformatted text preview: flux from the well to the mud gas separator in accordance with the Transocean well control manual. Shortly thereafter, the rig crew activated the upper annular preventers and the upper variable bore ram, after mud ejected from the well was already on the rig floor. The failure of the Deepwater Horizon crew (including BP, Transocean, and Sperry‐Sun personnel) to detect the influx of hydrocarbons until hydrocarbons were above the BOP stack was a cause of the well control failure. BP’s negative test procedures instructed personnel to monitor the well for no flow and no pressure on the kill line. According to personnel monitoring the well, the well was not flowing for 30 minutes and there was no pressure on the kill line. But anomalies present during the negative tests, such as the presence of drill pipe pressure when the kill line pressure was zero, should have prompted the rig crew to investigate the results further. The Deepwater Horizon crew’s (BP and Transocean) collective misinterpretation of the negative tests was a cause of the well control failure. B. Kick Detection Failure Contributing Causes Pit volume (flow‐out) data is more accurate measure of flow than calculating volume from pump output strokes and efficiency (flow‐in) and is the preferred method for measuring flow...
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This note was uploaded on 01/18/2014 for the course BEPP 305 taught by Professor Nini during the Fall '11 term at UPenn.

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