Cocalestestimonyat7175 117 118 51

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Unformatted text preview: urton in‐house cementing engineer, told the BP well site leaders and Brian Morel thatthe compressive strength analysis for the cement job had not been completed. 94 Nevertheless, BP continued the cement job without this information. The Panel found no evidence that BP or Halliburton ever shared the cement stability results or the OptiCem reports (showing gas flow potential) with Transocean personnel on the Deepwater Horizon or in the Houston office. Halliburton’s post‐blowout laboratory worksheets dated May 26, 2010, show that the foam‐slurry cement did not meet American Petroleum Institute Recommended Practice (“API RP”) 65. 95 Additionally, laboratory tests conducted by Chevron on behalf of the National Commission on the BP Deepwater Horizon Oil Spill and Deepwater Drilling (“Presidential Commission”) showed that the foamed cement slurry used on the Macondo well was not stable. 4. Cementing a Long String As discussed above, BP debated internally whether to use a long string or liner with tieback as the final production casing. BP had difficulties with the...
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This note was uploaded on 01/18/2014 for the course BEPP 305 taught by Professor Nini during the Fall '11 term at UPenn.

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