During the second explosion that door gotblownopen

Info iconThis preview shows page 1. Sign up to view the full content.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
This is the end of the preview. Sign up to access the rest of the document.

Unformatted text preview: efforts and was not consistent with proper pit management and monitoring. 259 Dr. Smith concluded that the crew could not properly monitor the well and detect kicks from 8:38 p.m. to 8:56 p.m. on April 20. During this time, the flow‐out was significantly less than the flow‐in, in a situation where lost returns were unlikely. At the same time, the trip tank volume was increasing rapidly, and the data showed that there was some volume increase in the main pits. Given the complications created by conducting multiple operations simultaneously, it is unlikely that the crew was able to evaluate these signals that a kick was in progress. 260 TRN‐USCG‐MMS00043810. Keith testimony at 39. 255 Id. at 98. 256 Id at. 39. 257 Id. at 81. 258 Id. at 82. 259 Smith Report at 22. 260 Id. 253 254 101 At 8:58 p.m., flow‐out increased significantly and the pit level rose by approximately 100 barrels in 15 minutes. According to Dr. Smith, at this point the crew should have recognized this as a warning sign, stopped circulation and p...
View Full Document

This note was uploaded on 01/18/2014 for the course BEPP 305 taught by Professor Nini during the Fall '11 term at UPenn.

Ask a homework question - tutors are online