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Unformatted text preview: t find evidence that BP communicated with the Transocean rig crew about such risks. Transocean had a number of documented safety programs in place at the time of the blowout. Nonetheless, the Panel found evidence that Transocean personnel questioned whether the Deepwater Horizon crew was adequately prepared to independently identify hazards associated with drilling and other operations. Everyone on board the Deepwater Horizon was obligated to follow the Transocean “stop work” policy that was in place on April 20, which provided that “[e]ach employee has the obligation to interrupt an operation to prevent an incident from occurring.” Despite the fact that the Panel identified a number of reasons that the rig crew could have invoked stop work authority, no individual on the Deepwater Horizon did so on April 20. The Panel found evidence that BP and, in some instances, its contractors violated the following federal regulations: 30 CFR § 250.107 – BP failed to protect health, safety, property, a...
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This note was uploaded on 01/18/2014 for the course BEPP 305 taught by Professor Nini during the Fall '11 term at UPenn.

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