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Unformatted text preview: weeks after the Deepwater Horizon’s BOP stack was positioned on the Macondo well. 381 The second leak was in the lower annular; the crew never determined where fluid was coming from but through testing ruled out a number of components related to the annular. 382 The third leak was in the lower test ram arising from the one of the solenoids on the yellow pod. 383 The crew function and pressure tested the BOP stack after these leaks were discovered and those tests were successful. 384 Mark Hay explained Transocean’s process for assessing leaks. When a leak is discovered, he said that “you would talk to the maintenance supervisor and OIM and then you would do a risk assessment on the rig, and then the rig team would make a decision, and you would give field support a call with your findings, your leak rates and all that, and they would determine if it is deemed necessary to pull and make repairs.” 385 BP noted the leak on the lower test ram in its internal daily operations report from February 23 until March 13. 386 Despite identifying this leak, BP did not take steps t...
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This note was uploaded on 01/18/2014 for the course BEPP 305 taught by Professor Nini during the Fall '11 term at UPenn.

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