Simsdraftemailresponsestatednothingisgoingtochangealll

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Unformatted text preview: production casing were not consistent with API RP 65 recommended practices, including the following: BP did not circulate a minimum volume of one bottoms‐up (the volume needed to be pumped to push the mud at the bottom of the wellbore to the surface) once the casing was on bottom, and the mud conditioning volume was less than one annular volume; With the casing shoe not run to the bottom, BP did not fill the “rat hole” with a higher weight mud capable of preventing cement from falling into the rat hole and thereby displacing rat hole fluid into the cement column and compromising the cement’s properties; and The hole diameter was less than three inches greater than the casing outside diameter. With respect to the production casing cement job, BP and Halliburton did not employ the industry‐accepted recommended practices described above. BP and Halliburton’s failure to perform the production casing cement job in accordance with industry‐accepted recommendations as defined in API RP 65 was a contributing cause of the blowout. BP chose to land the floa...
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This note was uploaded on 01/18/2014 for the course BEPP 305 taught by Professor Nini during the Fall '11 term at UPenn.

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