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Unformatted text preview: evidence that these meters were being monitored prior to the blowout. Once the crew discovered the hydrocarbon flow, it sent the flow to a mud‐
gas separator, a piece of equipment not designed to handle high flow rates. The mud‐gas separator could not handle the volume of hydrocarbons, and it discharged a gas plume above the rig floor that ignited. The Panel found evidence that the configuration of the Deepwater Horizon general alarm system and the actions of rig crew members on the bridge of the rig contributed to a delay in notifying the entire crew of the presence of very high gas levels on the rig. Transocean had configured the Deepwater Horizon’s general alarm system in “inhibited” mode, which meant that the general alarm would not automatically sound when multiple gas alarms were triggered in different areas on the rig. As a result, personnel on the bridge were responsible for sounding of the general alarm. Personnel on the bridge waited approximately 12 minutes after the sounding of the initial g...
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