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Unformatted text preview: l.” 352 However, the Panel found that this was not conclusive because the blue pod may have performed the AMF sequence some time after the loss of well control, which may have caused its as‐received condition. 349 DNV Report, Vo1. 1, at 171‐72. 350 Id. at 171. 351 Id. at 172 352 Id. 348 142 DNV stated that its tests of the blue pod in its as‐received condition demonstrated that “the 27 Volt battery in the Blue Pod had insufficient charge to activate the solenoid 103B.” DNV noted that there were no records showing that the batteries in the AMF system were tested during a factory acceptance test in June 2009. 353 DNV further noted that tests for the 27‐volt battery conducted in July 2010 (when the BOP was retrieved) “reported the battery level to be out of specification.” 354 The Deepwater Horizon crew did not have the ability to monitor the subsea electronic module (“SEM”) battery power supply, although the Panel is aware of technology that exists that would allow Transocean to perform this monitoring. If the crew had been able to monitor the SEM power supply, they could have known the real time condition of the AMF batteries. Two other theories regarding the failure of the BOP stack were advanced during JIT hearings. The first is that the hydraulic systems that powered the BSR did not have enough power to cause the blind shear rams to fully close and seal. A Cameron representative st...
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This note was uploaded on 01/18/2014 for the course BEPP 305 taught by Professor Nini during the Fall '11 term at UPenn.

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