Info iconThis preview shows page 1. Sign up to view the full content.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
This is the end of the preview. Sign up to access the rest of the document.

Unformatted text preview: eared to have agreed upon a simplified approach to the negative test that converted it from the previously‐approved multi‐step process. When asked in a post‐blowout interview why BP made the change from the April 16 approved procedure to the approach reflected in Morel’s April 20 Ops Note, Kaluza responded, “maybe [Guide and Morel were] trying to save time.” 221 Morel had previously articulated concerns about Kaluza’s ability to execute procedures. Prior to arriving at the Deepwater Horizon, Morel stated that Kaluza was “not in tune with the well.” Morel said that he had to “go out [to the Deepwater Horizon] and make sure they [the crew under Kaluza] follow every step.” 222 Morel traveled to the Deepwater Horizon and was on board on April 20. However, notwithstanding his stated concerns about the cement job, about Kaluza’s level of experience as the well site leader, and about the multiple changes to procedures that increased the risks of a well control event, Morel departed the Deepwater...
View Full Document

Ask a homework question - tutors are online