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Unformatted text preview: lso used the term on the Macondo well because on both wells the crew encountered similar lost circulation, stuck pipe, and kick problems). 161 BP‐HZN‐MBI00221686. 162 BP‐HZN‐BLY00125447. 160 75 David Sims, BP drilling and completions operations manager, expressed concern about the BP well site leaders’ well control abilities in an email written following the March 8 kick. He stated that the well site leaders “are not well control experts. They are fantastic drillers – the best in the SPU [BP drilling unit], if not the industry. However, they do not circulate out kicks for a living, especially 1200 feet off bottom with many unknowns.” 163 Mark Hafle told BP investigators in a post‐blowout interview that he believed some of the Sperry‐Sun mudloggers did not understand how to monitor the well properly, and that the Sperry‐Sun personnel were stretched too thin and did not have enough qualified mudloggers. 164 Notwithstanding the high level of concern about the March 8 kick and the rig crew’s response to the kick, BP did not conduct the type of investigation of the incident required by BP’s own pol...
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This note was uploaded on 01/18/2014 for the course BEPP 305 taught by Professor Nini during the Fall '11 term at UPenn.

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