moeller.remembering-the-war

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Unformatted text preview: 82 NOTES TO CHAPTER TWO 95. Klaus Theweleit, Male Fantasies, vols. 1—2 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1987, 1989). 96. These measures are discussed in Diehl, Thanks of the Fatherland. This “privatization of reconstruction” forms the central argument of a recent oral history study on the consequences of the war in West Germany. See Vera Neumann, Nicht der Rede Wert: Die Privatisierung der Kriegsfolgen in derfriihen Bundesrepublik: Lebensgeschichtliche Erinnerungen (Munster: Ver— lag Westf'alisches Dampfboot, 1999). 97. Bericht der Arbeitsgemeinschaft fiir Jugend- und Eheberatung in Hannover fu'r das Geschaftsjahr 1951/52, ADW, CA/W 408 A. The court in Hildesheim reported that every third marriage of returning POWs ended with a divorce. West German divorce rates reached a high- point of 187.7 per 100,000 residents in 1948 (1939: 89.1) and declined thereafter; see Statistis- ches Jahrbnch (1952), 45. 98. See the stories of postwar readjustments within families in Sibylle Meyer and Eva Schulze, Von Liebe sprach damals keiner: Familienalltag in der Nachkriesgzeit (Munich: Beck, 1985), 150—68, 206—13. 99. See, for example, the stories provided in Ingeborg Bruns, Als Vater aus dem Krieg heimkehrte: Tochter erinnern sich (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1991); Kiihne, “Kamerad- schaft,” 526, also emphasizes generational over gender conflict. 100. See Uta G. Poiger, “Rebels with a Cause? American Popular Culture, the 1956 Youth Riots, and New Conceptions of Masculinity in East and West Germany,” in Rainer Pommerin, ed., The American Impact on Postwar Germany (Providence, R.I.: Berghahn Books, 1995), 93— 124; see also Kapar Maase’s article in this volume. 101. Quoted in Der Spiegel 51, no. 23 (1997): 113. 102. Elizabeth Domansky, “Militarization and Reproduction in World War I,” in Geoff Eley, ed., Society, Culture, and the State in Germany, 1870—1930 (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1996), 427—63; Moeller, “Last Soldiers.” 103. On military reform and the ideal of the “citizen in uniform,” see David Clay Large, Ger- mans to the Front: West German Rearmament in the Adenauer Era (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1996), 177— 84; Moeller, “Last Soldiers”; on new conceptions of mas- culinity, see Poiger, “Rebels with a Cause?” 104. Susan Jeffords, The Remasculinization of America: Gender and the Vietnam War (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989); on “remasculinization” in Germany, see also Robert G. Moeller, “The Remasculinization of Germany in the 1950s: An Introduction,” Signs 24 (1998): 101—6; and idem, “Last Soldiers. ” 105. See the essay by Volker Berghahn in this volume. 106. On this relationship between “depoliticization” and “repoliticization” in West Germany, see Uta Poiger, Jazz, Rock, and Rebels: Cold War Politics and American Culture in a Divided Germany (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000). 107. On this comparison between East and West Germany, see my dissertation “The Pro- tracted War.” CHAPTER THREE I Rememberng the War in a Nation of Victims WEST GERMAN PASTS IN THE 19505 ROBERT G. MOELLER IN 1959, a decade after the founding of the Federal Republic of Germany, the philosopher Theodor Adorno sharply criticized West Germans for failing to accept responsibility for the crimes of National Socialism; he took them to task for their inability to “come to terms with the past.”1 AdOrno’s own past no doubt con- tributed to his fears of the potential for the “continued existence of National So- cialism within democracy” (original emphasis). National Socialism had driven him to the United States, a country where he never felt at home, and confronted him with a world of mass murder that brought him to reflect on the meanings of Auschwitz and the accident of his own survival. Through this lens, he critically as— sessed the processes of remembering and forgetting in the Federal Republic of the 19508 as West Germans sought to move beyond their “most recent history.” Fourteen years after the defeat of Germany, Adorno was angry and afraid be- cause of the apparently willful inability of many of his fellow citizens to ac— knowledge their responsibility for the most devastating war in world history and a racialist campaign to “cleanse” Europe of Jews and other groups considered sub- human. For Adorno, the past that West Germans should “come to terms with” was the past of a terrorist state they had brought to power, the past of Auschwitz and the mass destruction inflicted by Germans on the rest of Europe. Adorno concluded that “the much—cited work of the reprocessing of the past [Aufarbeitung der Ver— gangenheit] has not yet succeeded, and has instead degenerated into its distorted image—empty, cold, forgetting.”2 Adorno’s judgment has been echoed by countless others who have commented on the silence surrounding the past of National Socialism in the 19505. Adorno’s reflections, however, do not adequately capture how West Germans remembered and processed their “most recent history” (jungste Vergangenheit) in the first decade and a half after the war’s end; they came to terms with the past but not in ways that Adorno prescribed. There were many accounts of Germany’s “most re— cent history” that circulated in the Federal Republic; remembering selectively was not the same as forgetting. Although not in ways that satisfied Adorno, in the early 19503 many West Ger- mans showed a willingness to acknowledge the horrors of what the first chancel- lor, Konrad Adenauer, called the “saddest chapter” in their history.3 They took re- sponsibility for making amends for crimes that had been committed “in the name 84 CHAPTER THREE of the German people.”4 Defining the “path to Israel”——Adenauer’s pursuit of reparations for the state that had become home to many survivors of the German attempt to murder all European J ews—and programs to provide compensation for some others persecuted by the Nazi state established a crucial public policy arena in which West Germans accounted for the crimes of National Socialism.5 In the debates over reparations for Israel, the German past was filled with face— less criminals who acted “in the name of the German people.” Pathbreaking work by Norbert Frei has shown how West Germans also explicitly addressed the past of National Socialism and war when they demanded that felons with faces—Nazis charged and sentenced by the Allies for particularly egregious offenses—be granted amnesty. They sought not to avoid or suppress the past but to rectify what they saw as the unduly harsh punishments imposed by the victorious Allies. Frei, Curt Garner, Ulrich Brochhagen, and James Diehl have also detailed West Ger- man attempts to rehabilitate and reintegrate former Nazis through legislative mea- sures that transformed them into the victims of misguided postwar Allied denazi- fication efforts, premised on assumptions of “collective guilt” and the equation of membership in the Nazi party with responsibility for the excesses of the Nazi state.6 In other war stories from the late 1940s and 1950s, Germans were not innocent fellow travelers; rather, they had resisted the Nazi regime and provided evidence of another, better Germany even from within the depths of the Third Reich. West German discussions of the meaning and significance of resistance focused not on the opposition of Communists, a legacy claimed by those other Germans across the border in the East, but on the participants in the attempt on Hitler’s life on 20 July 1944, and groups with no specific political affiliation like the “White Rose.” This version of the last years of the war offered proof that Germans had demon- strated their eagerness to liberate themselves from the Nazi yoke before they were liberated by the Allies.7 This article focuses on still other memories of National Socialism and the war’s end that were crucial to the self-definition of the Federal Republic. It examines how stories of the consequences of the war on the Eastern front became parts of public memory in the 1950s. In telling the story of the end of the war in the East, West Germans emphasized the stunning evidence of crimes committed not by Ger- mans against others, but by others against Germans, crimes that, according to some contemporary accounts, were comparable to the crimes of Germans against the Jews. The most important representatives of German victimhood were the women, men, and children who left or were driven out of Eastern Europe by the Red Army at the war’s end and others in German uniform for whom the war ended with cap- tivity in the Soviet Union. There were some 12 million expellees, nearly two-thirds of whom resided in the Federal Republic in 1950. According to contemporary sources, over 3 million German soldiers had spent some time in Soviet hands, and more than a million of them reportedly died in captivity.8 These groups were joined by their common experience of a direct confrontation with the Red Army; they were eyewitnesses to the war on the Eastern front, a front that moved steadily west- ward in late 1944 and early 1945. About the pasts of these victims, their relatives REMEMBERING THE WAR 35 Figure 3.1: In early summer 1943, some 52,000 German soldiers were marched through the streets of Moscow on their way into Soviet prisoner of war camps. According to contem- porary estimates, over 3 million German soldiers spent some time in Soviet captivity. Cour— tesy of the Bundesarchiv Koblenz, 183/E0406/22/9. and loved ones, and the victims next door, most West Germans were anything but “empty, cold, forgetting”; indeed, these were pasts that they recalled with tremen- dous passion and extraordinary detail. Shifting the focus from what West Germans should have remembered to what they did remember reveals that a past of German suffering was ubiquitous in the 1950s. This article describes how in the first postwar decade the stories of ex- pellees from eastern Germany and Eastern Europe and German POWs imprisoned 86 CHAPTER THREE in the Soviet Union were crafted into rhetorics of victimization in the arena of pub- lic policy and in the writing of Zeitgeschichte (contemporary history). West Ger- mans collectively mourned the suffering of these groups, and their experiences became central to one important version of the legacy of the war; their private memories structured public memory, making stories of Communist brutality and the loss of the “German East” crucial parts of the history of the Federal Republic. Focusing on German suffering also made it possible to talk about the Third Reich’s end without assessing responsibility for its origins, to tell an abbreviated story of National Socialism in which all Germans were ultimately victims of a war that Hitler started but everyone lost. In the 1950s, this was the past that most West Ger- mans chose to remember. Competing pasts of the victims of World War II pervaded public policy debates in the early history of the Federal Republic. When Konrad Adenauer first addressed the newly elected parliament in September 1949, the chancellor expressed his con- cern about nascent antisemitic tendencies in West Germany and his sense of pro- found disbelief that “after all that has happened in our time, there should still be people in Germany who persecute or hate Jews because they are Jews.” Just as troubling to Adenauer, however, was another past that lived on in the present, a past in which others were persecuted because they were German. Heading the list were “1.5 to 2 million German prisoners of war,” whose whereabouts were un- known but who were most likely in the Soviet Union or elsewhere in Eastern Eu- rope; expellees, “whose deaths number in the millions”; and other ethnic Germans still held against their will by Eastern European Communist governments. Hon— oring the dead, bringing home the POWs and others unjustly held, and meeting the needs of all German victims of the war were essential parts of a just social con- tract in a new democratic republic.9 The Bundestag, the West German parliament, addressed these multiple pasts in its first electoral period, the years 1949—53. In 1949 some critics were skeptical that Adenauer’s government would adequately meet the obligations of Germans to compensate those persecuted by the National Socialist regime. However, by the time the Bundestag ratified a treaty providing for the payment of reparations to Is- rael almost four years later, there was no question that the Christian Democratic chancellor was politically committed to reconciliation with Israel. In September 1951, Adenauer announced officially that “the Federal Government and with it the great majority of the German people are aware of the immeasurable suffering that was brought upon the Jews in Germany and the occupied territories during the time of National Socialism. . . . Unspeakable crimes were committed in the name of the German people, and these oblige [us] to make moral and material amends [Wiedergutmachung].”10 Adenauer’s passive construction carefully differentiated between guilt and responsibility; crimes had been committed, but no criminals were named. Nonetheless, the chancellor left no doubt that West Germans must squarely confront the claims of Jewish victims. West Germany’s official overture to Israel met considerable domestic opposition REMEMBERING THE WAR 87 from those who questioned the need for payments to persecuted Jews. Adenauer faced not only hostile public opinion but the resolute resistance of leading members of his own party, who claimed that reparations exceeded the means of an impover- ished postwar Germany and that compensation for Jewish victims would spark re— sentment among Germans and a resurgence of antisemitism.11 The chancellor’s mo- tives in overcoming these impediments to the reparations treaty and pushing through approval by the cabinet and ratification by the Bundestag in March 1953 are sub- ject to more than one interpretation. There is much evidence that Adenauer was ul- timately driven by his desire to convince the Western Allies that Germany would confront its moral obligations for the past in order to gain full acceptance as an equal partner in the postwar Western alliance. Negotiations with Israel ran parallel to de- liberations over West German integration into a Western European defense alliance; they tied Germans’ “moral rearmament” to the military rearmament of the West Ger- man state. In his memoirs and other accounts, Adenauer’s actions expressed firmly held convictions, not a response to Allied expectations and pressure. Ultimately, whatever the balance between sincerely held moral beliefs and political realism, it is difficult to imagine that without the chancellor’s forceful intervention the Bun— destag would have ratified the reparations agreement with Israel.12 The West German state also acknowledged the “saddest chapter” in its history by addressing the demands for compensation from others persecuted by the Nazis and still resident in the Federal Republic. In the same year that it ratified the treaty with Israel, the Bundestag approved legislation that built on state initiatives, par— ticularly in the US. zone of occupation, and established a national framework to address individual claims from these other victims of the Nazis. Constantin Goschler analyzes and documents in detail the West German at— tempts to “make good” (Wiedergutmachung) the harm done by National Social- ism and shows the clear limits most West Germans placed on what constituted “racial, religious, or political” persecution during the Third Reich. Victims not for— gotten but explicitly excluded from these categories included gay men, subjects of forced sterilization, foreign slave workers, violators of racist laws against sexual relations between “Aryans” and “non-Aryans,” and for the most part Sinti and Roma (so-called “Gypsies”).13 These exclusions revealed a West German ten- dency to equate racial persecution exclusively with antisemitism and to collapse National Socialist atrocities into the mass extermination of the Jews.14 Even with these limitations, however, the law to provide compensation to the victims of Nazi crimes encountered substantial criticism from many West German citizens and state officials. 15 Again, it was Adenauer’s intervention and the solid support of op- position Social Democrats that provided the majority sufficient to override popu- lar and official resistance to the compensation scheme. Public discussion of restitution for victims of National Socialism and repara~ tions for Israel revealed how divided West Germans remained over their respon— sibility for the atrocities of the Third Reich. The treaty with Israel and the estab- lishment of an institutional framework to acknowledge the loss and suffering of other victims of “racial, religious, or political” persecution represented the explicit 88 CHAPTER THREE admission, however, that the Nazi state had committed crimes “in the name of the German people.” Particularly in the first four years of the Federal Republic, the Bundestag and Adenauer did not entirely avoid or repress this part of the past. Acknowledgment of Jewish victims of National Socialist crimes was directed at an international audience, but it also made it easier for the Bonn government to acknowledge German victims of the Red Army and postwar Communism. In the process, the fates of these two victim groups were frequently linked. On the agenda of the same session in which Bundestag delegates debated the final form of the treaty with Israel were initiatives to address the problems of those fleeing from the Soviet-occupied zone of Germany and those expelled from Eastern Europe.16 The ghosts of Victims, some Jewish, some German, often seemed to hover in the halls of the Bundestag, competing for recognition. Victims were also joined to~ gether under the word millions, a term associated with Jewish victims of National Socialism, prisoners of war in the Soviet Union, and expellees.17 In debates over compensation for veterans returning from prisoner-of-war camps, Margarete Hut- ter, a staff member of the German Office for Peace (Deutsches Bfiro fiir Friedens- fragen) could group together the prisoner of war, “the representative of the sacri- fice brought by all Germans,” with the “victim of the concentration camp.” These groups were the “most tragic figures of the politics of the Third Reich,” both vic- tims of Hitler’s Germany.18 The rhetoric of German victimization and Soviet barbarism could be traced back to the last years of the war.19 New in the postwar years, however, was the explicit equation of the suffering of German victims and victims of Germans. Jews and Germans had experienced the same forms of persecution argued Adenauer’s min— ister of transportation, Hans—Christoph Seebohm, a member of the German party (Deutsche Partei), because “the methods that were used by the National Socialist leaders against the Jews and that we most vehemently condemn are on a par with the methods that were used against the German expellees.”20 German expellees became another category of victims driven from their historic homelands because of their “ethnicity” (Volkszugehorigkeit); Jews persecuted by Germans were one group of Victims among others.21 If compensation for Jewish victims was part of a West German strategy to gain favor with the Western Allies, measures to meet the needs of German Victims were not. Indeed the Bundestag discussions of German suffering unified all political parties in sharp criticism of the Western forces of postwar occupation, which were depicted as doing nothing to meet the needs of these groups. The British and Amer— icans were taken to task for viewing German losses through the distorted lens of theories of “collective guilt.”22 To be sure, in the early 1950s, descriptions of Ger- man suffering were more likely to portray the losses inflicted on Germans by the Red Army than cities destroyed by US. and British bomber pilots. It is not sur— prising that in the context of the Cold War, attacking the Soviet Union—past and present—was far easier than recounting the sins of former enemies who were now allies. In some cases, however, criticism of the Soviet Union was also a medium for denouncing the postwar settlement and the Western Allies who had unques- tioningly accepted it. West Germans charged that by endorsing the mandatory re- REMEMBERING THE WAR 89 moval of millions of Germans from areas in Eastern Europe seized by the Red Army and doing nothing to meet the needs of German Victims of the war, the Al- lies had responded to Nazi injustice with unjust acts of no less consequence,23 leaving Germans “to dish out the soup that the military governments had pre- pared.”24 _ In a host of federal programs aimed at meeting the needs of “war-damaged” groups, particularly expellees and veterans, and, among them, returning prisoners of war, the West German state set out to “equalize the burdens” of the arbitrary consequences of the war. A host of social-welfare measures sought to mediate the differences between the woman whose husband had come back from the war and the woman whose husband had not, between veterans who were permitted to re- turn immediately after the end of fighting and prisoners of war, between POWs in the Soviet Union and those in the hands of the Western Allies, between POWs whose former homes were now “behind the iron curtain” and those who had lived in western Germany before the war, and between “new citizens” (Neubiirger) driv— en from their homes in Eastern Europe and West Germans who had suffered no such dramatic displacement.25 Achieving some measure of social justice among those who had suffered little or nothing and those who had lost everything emerged as a key measure of the legitimacy of the West German state.26 In the process of identifying the needs of war veterans and expellees, the West German state also allowed German victims to act for themselves, represent their own interests, and shape policy. After World War I, veterans and others who had suffered most from the war and the economic instability of the early postwar years had perceived themselves to be excluded from parliamentary deliberations of com- pensation for their losses; their resentment translated into loud attacks on the “Weimar system.”27 In the Bonn republic, mass organizations of expellees and vet- erans quickly emerged as important actors in negotiations over how best to meet their needs. Their interests were also represented in a cabinet-level office, the Min- istry for Expellees, Refugees, and War—Damaged (Bundesministerium fur Ver- triebene, Flfichtlinge, und Kriegsgesch'adigte), and they spoke from the floor of the Bundestag as members of all major political parties.28 Despite the broad consensus favoring payments to German victims of the war and the expulsion, no victim group received everything it wanted. Finance Minis- ter Fritz Sch'affer constantly reminded his colleagues that Germany was a poor na- tion, barely able to contribute to containing Communism in the present, let alone to pay for Communism’s past crimes against expellees and POWs.29 Discontent over a glass half—empty, however, did not lead to massive political opposition to the Bonn government as it had to the Weimar Republic. In part, this was because veterans and expellees, the two most effectively organized groups claiming com- pensation, had been asked to participate in defining solutions for their own prob- lems and had achieved at least something of what they were after. As James Diehl has convincingly argued in his analysis of those policies aimed specifically at vet- erans, the West German government also won acceptance for its initiatives to “equalize the burdens” of the war and compensate the “war-damaged” by stress- ing that it had crafted programs that were singularly German, grounded in the best 90 CHAPTER THREE tradition of the German social—welfare system and seen as the essential corrective to punitive policies imposed by the Allies in the years of postwar occupation.3O Defining the just claims and rights to entitlement of some and the moral oblig- ations of others was part of establishing the bases for social solidarity in West Ger- many. The Germany that committed crimes against others was an aberration; it was succeeded by a Germany that helped to ease German suffering. All major politi- cal parties could agree on the version of the legacy of National Socialism that was embodied in Bundestag discussions of the victims of the expulsion and the sur— vivors of Soviet captivity; the suffering of these groups remained outside the realm of political wrangling. The deep divisions between Social Democrats and Ade- nauer’s government were at least momentarily bridged by a shared relationship to the lasting consequences of a common past. For the West German state, acknowledging the pasts of expellees and prisoners of war not only involved assessing material need, it also included ensuring that the testimonies of these groups would become part of West Germany’s public mem— ory. In the case of those driven out of Eastern Europe, the Bonn government pledged to preserve the “cultural values” of the expellees by incorporating the his~ tory of Germans in Eastern Europe into West German school curricula and estab- lishing a series of research institutes for the scholarly study of the Central Euro- pean past and present. The state formally acknowledged that it would be essential to educate West Germans about the history of Germans in Eastern and Central Eu— rope, who were now the “new citizens” (Neubiirger) in a democratic republic.31 West Germans were also constantly reminded of the soldiers for whom the war on the Eastern front had been followed by the battle to survive Soviet captivity; those German POWs still in the Soviet Union were never far from public atten— tion. Newspaper stories describing “Graves and Barbed Wire: The Fate of Mil— lions” evoked images of millions of German POWs, not millions of victims of con- centration camps.32 Annual days of remembrance for POWs called attention to those Germans for whom the war was not yet over.33 Little more than five years after the war’s end, the Federal Republic was also calling on the United Nations to investigate charges of the violation of human rights, not of others by Nazis but of German POWs and deported ethnic Germans by their Soviet captors.34 The state’s commitment to creating a detailed record of German loss and suf— fering was also apparent in its sponsorship of two projects that sought to collect the memories of POWs and expellees as sources for writing the “contemporary history” of the postwar period. A systematic effort to document the “expulsion of the Germans from the East” was formally initiated by the Ministry for Expellees, Refugees, and War—Damaged shortly after the creation of the office in Adenauer’s first government. Its editorial board was made up of eminent professional histori— ans led by Theodor Schieder of the University of Cologne, who had lived and taught in Konjgsberg until the war drove him west in 1944.35 His co—workers in- cluded Hans Rothfels, who also had worked in Konigsberg until 1938, when he fled the Nazis, who considered only his Jewish origins, not his Protestant baptism. Rothfels had returned from the United States, where he had spent the war years, REMEMBERING THE WAR 91 Figure 3.2: “Our Prisoners of War and the Deportees (civilian prisoners) Accuse.” The Ger- man prisoner of war in Soviet hands became an important symbol of the postwar Commu— nist brutality against Germans. In the early 1950s, West Germans had to defend themselves against charges of their own crimes against others during World War II, but they also played the role of the accuser, indicting postwar Communist governments that continued to im- prison German soldiers and civilians. Courtesy of the Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, Plak 5/47/49. to take a chair at Tiibingen.36 Working on individual volumes was a team that in— cluded Werner Conze, the major West German proponent of social history in the 1950s, and a number of youthful assistants, among them Martin Broszat, who later went on to direct the Munich Institute for Contemporary History, and Hans-Ulrich Wehler, who in the 19605 would emerge as the leading advocate of a “historical social science.”37 In eight volumes, including three full-length diaries, the Dokumentation der Vertreibung der Deutschen aus 0st-Mitteleur0pa (Documentation of the Expul- sion of Germans from East—Central Europe) described the experiences of Germans as they fled before the Red Army advance in 1944 and 1945 and as they left and 92 CHAPTER THREE E _ 151 u, Figure 3.3: “Expellees: Your Misery Is Our Misery.” This poster issued by the Christian De— mocratic Union (CDU) represents the kind of direct political appeals that all postwar West German political parties made to victim groups. The use of a female image to symbolize the fate of the expellee also suggests that women and children were overrepresented among those driven out of Eastern Europe at the end of the war. Courtesy of the Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, Plak 4/8/27. REMEMBERING THE WAR 93 were driven from their homelands in Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and Yu~ goslavia and from the eastern parts of Germany that became Poland after the Ger~ man surrender.38 At the core of the project was a massive collection of some 11,000 eyewitness accounts recorded by expellees themselves, frequently assembled with the cooperation of their interest-group organizations. The editors were aware of the problems inherent in such subjective testimony, but they guaranteed that the fraction of the reports ultimately published had been subjected to painstaking “au— thentication and verification” and constituted a completely reliable record of the “entire process of the expulsion in [its] historical accuracy.”39 The “documents of the expulsion” were, as one review put it, “documents of horror.”40 Countless individual reports of terror, rape, plundering, the separation of families, forced deportations, starvation, slave labor, and death combined to give shape to the “mass fate” of Germans in Eastern Europe, the “German tragedy,” “contemporary history in documents.”41 Even those eyewitnesses who claimed to have been skeptical of the terrifying picture of the Bolshevik painted in Nazi pro- paganda conceded that they confronted a reality that often exceeded Joseph Goebbels’s predictions.42 The federal government complemented the volumes on the expulsion with an extensive collection of testimonies from prisoners of war. Although its work was not completed until the 19703, the POW project also had its origins in the 19503 and was seen explicitly as an essential continuation of the effort to capture the eye— witness accounts of expellees. Detailed descriptions of the conditions in Soviet camps had been collected since the late 19405 by veterans’ associations, the Ger— man Red Cross, and church organizations, which had taken the lead in tracing the fates of German POWs. After 1953, much of this documentation was collected by the Bundesarchiv. In 1957 the West German state appointed a “scientific commis- sion” to assemble these eyewitness accounts and other forms of evidence in order to provide a complete “documentation of the fate of German prisoners in the Sec- ond World War,” an initiative that in the words of one newspaper account would create the opportunity for “Prisoners of War [to] Write Contemporary History.”43 The documentation should serve “for the present and future of our nation to secure the suffering of the prisoners, which has already begun to fade from public con— sciousness,” a record that could meet the most demanding criteria of “objectivity” and “exactitude.”44 Heading the project was Erich Maschke, a chairholder at the University of Jena under the Nazis, a prisoner of war in the Soviet Union until his release in 1953, and in the 19505 a professor of social and economic history at the University of Heidelberg.45 Maschke and his co—workers ultimately sifted through thousands of written and tape-recorded accounts. Of the twenty-two books published by the project, thirteen described the areas where German POWs had been most nu- merous, their treatment had been worst, and they had remained imprisoned the longest—Poland, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, and particularly the Soviet Union, which alone filled eight volumes; the testimonies assembled were more evidence of Cormnunist atrocities in Eastern Europe.46 This emphasis on the East corre- sponded to the contemporary assessment that the differences in the treatment of 94 CHAPTER THREE German POWs by Western Allies and Communists were ones of kind, not de- gree.47 For POWs, no concerns loomed larger than malnutrition and starvation, and they described the dangerous balancing act of remaining sick enough to avoid forced labor but well enough to avoid death.48 Work rebuilding the Soviet Union was sometimes remembered as a source of pride and accomplishment, but it was more frequently equated with slave labor, as one POW remarked, a form of direct retribution that represented the “payment of reparations.”49 Particularly for the pe- riod of the late 1940s, reports were filled not only with tallies of death from mal- nutrition but also with accounts of mass shootings by Red Army troops and Com- munist partisans and the dumping of the dead into unmarked graves.50 The experiences of POWs in the Soviet Union diverged from those of expellees in important respects. The POW camp was a world without women, a sharp con- trast with the westward “treks” of expellees, in which women outnumbered men. In addition, for at least some of the students in the “barbed-wire university,” as POWs ironically called the camps, the school term ended only in the mid—1950s, while for most expellees the return “not to home [Heimat] but at least to the Fa- therland” was complete by the late 1940s.51 Despite these differences, the accounts of expellees and POWs also provided much evidence of the ways in which they had experienced the end of the same war. As the Red Army moved westward in late 1944, the line between front and home front dissolved. In the words of Mar- garete Schell, a German actress from Prague and the author of one of the full- length diaries published by the Schieder project, Germans in Czechoslovakia had lived “a soldier’s life . . . only much worse.”52 The history of National Socialism and the war that both expellees and POWs told began only at the moment when the Red Army appeared, reaching the out- skirts of the village or capturing the soldier. In neither documentation project did the editors elicit testimony about Germany’s war of aggression on the Eastern front or German rule in Eastern Europe; both projects recorded and sanctioned silence and selective memory. In both cases as well, victimization by the Red Army fol— lowed victimization by benighted, fanatical Nazis who postponed evacuation in the face of the Red flood or insisted on fighting to the bitter end. This was the same history that was told from the floor of the Bundestag in debates over measures to meet the material needs of expellees and returning veterans, a history peopled with innocents in which a handful of zealous Nazis had deluded good Germans. Vic- tims of Germans were not completely absent from these accounts, but when those who testified acknowledged the suffering of Jews at the hands of Germans, it was most frequently in order to establish a measure for the horror of their own experi- ence.53 In some cases, POWs, expellees, and the editors of the documentation pro- jects claimed that what Germans had suffered under Communists was comparable in its horror only to what Jews had suffered under Nazis. History had repeated itself concluded Maria Zatschek, an expellee from Czecho— slovakia who remarked, “what a bad comedy all this is: nothing is original, a copy of the Hitler regime, again and again we have to hear: ‘Just as you have treated the Jews.’ “54 It was this similarity of suffering reflected Wolfgang Schwarz, author of REMEMBERING THE WAR 95 the volume on “cultural life” among German POWs in the Soviet Union that made the POWs “brothers of the prisoners in the concentration camps.”55 In their as- sessment of the expulsion from Czechoslovakia, the editors of the documentation expressed similar views. They pointed out that the analogy between German and Jewish victims was unmistakable when Germans took the place of Jews in former Nazi concentration camps: “In some of these camps, particularly Theresienstadt, only the victims had changed: where Jewish prisoners had suffered from the Na- tional Socialist system of oppression, Germans were now tortured and mal- treated.”56 Both POWs and expellees depicted themselves individually and col— lectively as victims of an ideology no less irrational than National Socialism; like the Nazis, the Soviets had reduced identity to ethnicity, singling out their victims only because they were Germans. The standard of measurement of the sufferings of Germans thus became “the horrible crimes committed against the Jews in Hitler’s concentration camps,”57 the goal of the Communists, nothing less than the “cleansing” and “de—Germanization” (Entgermanisierung) of Eastern Europe.58 In Bundestag debates over restitution for victims of the war, Germans and Jews were rhetorically lumped together. In the accounts provided in the documentation projects and in some of the editorial commentary that framed eyewitness stories, the overwhelming similarity of the treatment of all victims and the moral equiva- lence of their suffering were stated even more explicitly. Some German eyewit- nesses could claim to know what Jews had experienced, not because they them- selves were guilty of crimes but because what Jews in concentration camps had endured “could not possibly have been worse” than what Germans had suffered at the hands of the Communists.59 There is no way to assess how many West Germans read the testimonies recorded in the documentation projects. The POW project only began publishing its findings in the 1960s, and the final installment was not issued until 1974. One reason for this delay was that by the time all volumes were completed the West German government had become far less intent on sustaining memories of Com- munist atrocities. In an age of “peaceful coexistence” between East and West, some pasts were best allowed to slumber or to circulate at most in small editions, dis— tributed to research institutes and university libraries.60 The expellee project com- pleted publication by 1961, but its considerable bulk doubtless also limited its ac- cessibility. However, for the tens of thousands of POWS and expellees whose experiences were documented—and the millions more they represented—the in— v1tation to bear witness and the assurance that their memories would be preserved as part of an official chronicle made it easier, as Maschke expressed it, for these German victims to “overcome the destiny of painful and terrifying memories.”61 Public recognition and individual catharsis were parts of the same process.62 The federally sponsored publication projects that chronicled the fate of German expellees and POWs also corroborated other accounts of German suffering at the war’s end that circulated in West German politics and popular culture in the 1950s. Expellees’ and veterans’ organizations encouraged their constituents to record their experiences and to publicize the enormity of their suffering; interest—group publications provided a forum in which it was possible to foster group identities.63 96 CHAPTER THREE Memories of POWs in the Soviet Union and expellees also resounded in the arena of foreign policy. The record of German loss was cited as evidence in sup— port of demands to revise the postwar settlement that had extended Poland’s boundary westward significantly into territory once part of the German Reich.64 The last remaining POWs in the Soviet Union also remained a national preoccu- pation until Adenauer negotiated their release in September 1955. When the 9,626 POWs began to leave the Soviet Union the next month, West German press ac- counts used the occasion not only to celebrate these survivors of Communist cap— tivity but to rehearse endlessly the horrors that they had experienced.65 As late as 1967, shortly after Adenauer’s death, 75 percent of those questioned in a public opinion survey placed the release of the last POWs from the Soviet Union at the top of the list of the first chancellor’s accomplishments.66 Themes of expulsion and the experiences of soldiers on the Eastern front were also the stuff of novels and movies. Between 1951 and 1959, some 19 million viewers saw Grzin ist die Heide (The Heath Is Green), a movie that tells the story of a Pomeranian landowner who flees westward at the end of the war, leaving everything behind. Only the generosity of new friends in the Luneburger Heide and the natural beauty of the forest allow him to “forget what I have lost.”67 An entire genre of “expellee literature” told similar tales but focused less on the suc— cessful integration of expellees into West German society than on the terror they had experienced before reaching their new home.68 Numerous as well were popular novels, memoirs, and movies that described the war on the Eastern front and the long march into Soviet POW camps from the per— spective of the common soldier, victimized first by zealous Nazi leaders, then by the Red Army. These were epic dramas of suffering, inner strength, and quiet courage stemming not from ideology but from common decency and tales of ad- venturous schemes to resist Communism by whatever means possible.69 Such ac— counts were part of the general tendency in the 19505 to see the returning German veteran as a noble survivor, unjustly branded by the victors as a militaristic crim- inal; they contributed to a conventional wisdom according to which the Wehrmacht had dutifully carried out orders, scrupulously following the established rules of warfare.70 The same general themes gained credence among West Germany’s Western allies, particularly as the United States increased its pressure to see West Germans once again in uniform, essential recruits in the battles of the Cold War.71 The imposing bound volumes from the POW and expellee documentation pro- jects did not circulate nearly as widely as these other accounts in the popular media, but they told the same stories. They sanctioned and substantiated fiction- alized tales and individual memoirs, blurring the line between fiction and fact. As one reviewer of the first volumes published by the Schieder project noted, this au- thorized record should dispel completely whatever skepticism had greeted other dramatic presentations of the experiences of expellees in the late 1940s and early 1950s. The documentation delivered “irrefutable proof of the accuracy of those de— scriptions” as well.72 The debates over material compensation for Jews and others persecuted by the Nazis made clear that these “racial, political, and religious” victims of National REMEMBERING THE WAR 97 Figure 3.4: “We Admonish: The Prisoner of War Camp as Experience and Lesson.” This poster advertised a traveling exhibition sponsored by the Association of Returning Veter— ans in 1953. The image also appeared on a lOPfg stamp issued by the West German gov— ernment in the same year. It indicates the way in which shaved heads and barbed wire were associated in West German popular consciousness not with victims of Nazi concentration camps but rather with German prisoners of war in Soviet captivity. Courtesy of the Bundes- archiv, Koblenz. Plak 5/47/50. 98 CHAPTER THREE Figure 3.5: In September 1955, Konrad Adenauer traveled to Moscow. In return for assur— ing the Soviets that he would grant them diplomatic recognition, Adenauer received promises that the last remaining German prisoners of war would be released. These return— ing soldiers were on one of the first transports from the Soviet Union in October 1955. Ade- nauer’s negotiation of the release of the last German prisoners of war was long remembered as one of the most important accomplishments of his tenure as chancellor. Courtesy of the Bundesarchiv, Koblenz, 146/ 85/24/ 14. Socialism were not forgotten, but they remained faceless and without speech. In Adenauer’s cabinet, there was no Ministry for Survivors of Nazi Persecution and Nazi Concentration Camps, intent on acknowledging, ordering, analyzing, and sanctioning the suffering of the victims of Germans. Although a number of mem— oirs of concentration camp victims were published in Germany in the first two years following the war, by the late 1940s this was increasingly a genre that West German trade publishers avoided.73 To be sure, documentation of the crimes of Germans against others was avail— able, and the trials of leading Nazi war criminals by the Nuremberg Tribunal alone generated a mountain of evidence of German atrocities, a crucial source for key aspects of German “contemporary history.” In the 19503, the Institute for Con— temporary History in Munich drew on this documentation and other sources to begin writing a critical history of the National Socialist regime. No attempts were made, however, to supplement objective analysis with personal accounts of those persecuted by the Nazi regime. For example, the Schieder documentation offered many descriptions of the crimes committed by Poles and Soviets against Germans in Lodz, but neither the West German state nor West German scholars undertook REMEMBERING THE WAR 99 systematic efforts to record Jewish voices that could have told other stories of Ger- mans who until the spring of 1945 called that city Litzmannstadt.74 For the most part, victims of Germans remained objects, not subjects, of their own history, a his- tory never told from their perspective.75 In 1955, Hans Rothfels, a coworker on the expellee documentation project and ed— itor of the Werteljahrshefiefiir Zeitgeschichte (Quarterly Journal of Contemporary History), the most important new postwar German historical periodical, illumi- nated the “profound paradox” of the war’s end by drawing up a balance sheet called “Ten Years After” (“Zehn J ahre danach”). He effectively summarized how competing pasts had become part of the history of the Federal Republic. Rothfels recalled both the “horrible things that took place in occupied areas, particularly in the East” and what was done “to real and imagined opponents in concentration camps,” even as he described in far greater detail the expulsion of Germans from Eastern Europe and the last~gasp attempts of the German army and navy to hold off the Red Army. The way to remember May 1945, Rothfels concluded, was with an “hour of commemoration” for all victims, including those killed by Germans as well as those Germans “murdered after the end of hostilities, those who drowned or perished in the snow as they attempted to flee, who froze or starved, who did not survive the forced marches or forced labor camps [Zwangslager] . . . and also those women, who after the deepest humiliation took their own lives, or their hus- bands, who resisted this disgrace,” an unambiguous reminder of the literal rapes that heralded the symbolic rape of eastern Germany and Eastern Europe by the Red Army. Mourning these German victims should not, Rothfels warned, diminish memories of the suffering of others. A complete tally could, however, only be one that captured “reality in its horrifying totality.”76 West Germans were by no means silent about the “horrifying totality” of the past in the first decade after the end of the war, but their memories were selec— tive. They had less to say about the parts of that totality in which some Germans were perpetrators than about the parts that encompassed their own experiences as victims. With this past—the past of what they had lost—they literally filled volumes. Remembering the end of the war and memorializing their own suffering was part of the process by which West Germans came to terms with one set of pasts and created the bases on which it was possible to found the postwar order. The Basic Law (Grundgesetz), adopted in 1949, the constitutional basis for the Federal Republic of Germany, defined the institutions that would shape a democratic po- litical system in those parts of Germany occupied in 1945 by the French, British, and Americans. The formal act of founding the Federal Republic did not, however, establish collective identities that could bind West Germans together socially and politically, creating an “imagined community,” the phrase used by Benedict An— derson to describe the “deep horizontal comradeship” that forms the basis for the social and political solidarity that can unify a nation. Anderson analyzes cases in which an “imagined community” was largely shaped through an ideology of nation- alism.77 The problem for Germans after 1945 was not how to create a conception 100 CHAPTER THREE of the nation, but rather how to establish a sense of collectivity that did not draw on a nationalist rhetoric contaminated by its association with National Socialism. A revolution from above, imposed by the victorious Allies, provided no adequate framework, and in the Western zones of occupation, Allied programs of democra- tic reeducation were deeply resented by most Germans and largely abandoned by the late 1940s as the military powers that had crushed the Third Reich changed course and sought to accelerate the conversion of erstwhile enemies into allies in the battles of the Cold War. The de facto division of Germany and the Federal Re- public’s forced march into the Cold War Western alliance solidified geographic boundaries determined by the victors, but in the 19503, it was left to Germans, West and East, to create themselves. , An “imagined community” in the Federal Republic was shaped in part by sto- ries of the “economic miracle” (Wirtschaftswunder), West Germany’s rapid exit from devastation to prosperity. Currency reform in 1948 marked the end of the “war and postwar era” (Kriegs- und Nachkriegszeit) that began in 1943 with the German defeat at Stalingrad and the intensified bombing of German cities and ended five years later when the money they carried in their wallets, the goods of- fered in their shops, and the economic systems that structured their lives distin- guished Germans in East and West.78 In the next chapter of this tale of West Ger- many’s emergence from the rubble, American loans and the Marshall Plan sparked European economic recovery, but, so the story goes, it was ultimately uniquely German determination, hard work, and Economics Minister Ludwig Erhard’s model of a “social market economy” that permitted the Federal Republic to bask so quickly in the warm glow of economic prosperity.79 Writing in 1967 and echo~ ing many of Adorno’s concerns about the West German unwillingness to confront the Nazi past, psychologists Alexander and Margarate Mitscherlich saw in self— congratulatory accounts of postwar prosperity and economic recovery a clear in- dication of West Germans’ “inability to mourn” their complicity in National So- cialism. Leaving behind this difficult history was made possible by a massive self-investment in the “expansion and modernization of our industrial potential right down to the kitchen utensils.” In the psychic economy that the Mitscherlichs described, creating for the future was a way to avoid the past.80 Neither Adorno nor the Mitscherlichs fully understood that in the 19503, selec- tive memories of the war’s end also shaped the basis on which a new West Ger- many was erected. Shared values in the Federal Republic were not only created by celebrations of present prosperity and predictions of uninterrupted economic growth. One of the most powerful integrative myths of the 19503 emphasized not German well—being but German suffering; it stressed that Germany was a nation of victims, an “imagined community” defined by the lasting consequences of the devastation of the Second World War. Remembering what had been lost was of great significance for assessing postwar accomplishment and envisioning what still should be restored. In the 1950s, the stories of expellees and POWs in the Soviet Union became the stories of all West Germans; in the categories used by contemporaries, the fate of these groups came to represent the fate of postwar Germany. The Red Army’s rape NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE 101 of German women as it moved westward in the spring of 1945 became the rape of the German nation.81 The loss of homes and belongings in the East represented the eradication of a German Heimat, a sense of rootedness and belonging that had ex- isted for centuries in central Europe. The literal loss of property and the sources of livelihood by expellees became a metaphor for the displacement of other Germans, driven from their homes by falling bombs, and the flight of Eastern European Ger- mans into West Germany was a constant reminder of the division of the national Heimat between East and West. The detention of German POWs by the Soviets long after the release of most German prisoners in the late 19403 was universally condemned by West Germans as a case of arbitrary injustice, based only on a de- sire for vengeance. A violation of international law, Soviet treatment of German POWs allowed West Germans to claim that the Red variant of totalitarianism was just as capable of crimes against humanity in the 1950s as the brown variant had been in the 19403. POWs, presumed innocent, were doing penance for all Germans. And self-congratulatory accounts of the successful social and economic integration of expellees and returning POWs into West German society were tales of the Fed— eral Republic’s ability to overcome and move beyond the ravages of war, creating homes and a livelihood even for Germans who had lived elsewhere before 1945. The “imagined community” that emerged in West Germany in the 19503 was a community that acknowledged and overcame loss and suffering; its success was measured in its ability to affirm German Victims—the representatives of a vic- timized Germany—and to assist them in “coming to terms with” their pasts. In the late 19603 and 19703, West Germans came to a much more critical understanding of National Socialism. Memories of German victimization, dominant in the 19503, were challenged by accounts in which Nazi crimes and the victimization of others by Germans were central. Still, this complication of public memory never meant the complete silencing or forgetting of another version of the past in which Ger— mans had suffered as much as Jews and others persecuted by National Socialism. Seen against the background of the history of certain forms of public memory in the 19503, it becomes apparent that when themes of German innocence and vic— timization surfaced in the mid—19803 in the “Historians Dispute” or even more re- cently in May 1995 when Germans were exhorted not to forget “the beginning of the terror of the expulsion,” they represented nothing particularly novel but rather the return of the (never completely) repressed.82 In the sixth decade after the war’s end, “coming to terms with the past” must involve not only the continued study of National Socialism, European Jewry before the Holocaust, and the “final solu~ tion,” but also a clearer understanding of how Germans came to terms with other pasts—their own pasts as self—identified victims—in the early history of the Fed- eral Republic. NOTES This is a revised version of my article, “War Stories: The Search for a Usable Past in the Fed— eral Republic of Germany,” American Historical Review 101 (1996): 1008—48. I have recast the 102 NOTES To CHAPTER THREE introduction and conclusion to conform to the general themes of this volume, and I have incor- porated relevant literature that has appeared since the first publication of the article. Research for this article was supported by grants from the National Endowment for the Humanities, the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, and the Global Peace and Conflict Studies Program of the University of California, Irvine. My thanks to Lynn Mally, who commented ex- tensively on this revised version. 1. Theodor W. Adorno, “What Does Coming to Terms with the Past Mean?” in Geoffrey Hart- mann, ed., Bitburg in Moral and Political Perspective (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986), 114—26. 2. Ibid., 124. 3. Verhandlungen des deutschen Bundestags (Bonn: Universitats-Buchdruckerei Gebr. Scheur, 1950) (hereafter VDBT), (1.) Deutscher Bundestag, 252. Sitzung, 4 March 1953, 12092. 4. Quoted in Rolf Vogel, ed., Deutschlands Weg nach Israel: Eine Dokumentation mit einem Geleitwort von Konrad Adenauer (Stuttgart: Seewald Verlag, 1967), 36. 5. In general, see Jeffrey Herf, Divided Memory: The Nazi Past in the Two Germanys (Cam- bridge: Harvard University Press, 1997), particularly chapter 8, “Atonement, Restitution, and Justice Delayed: West Germany, 1949—1963,” 267—333; Lily Gardner Feldman, The Special Re- lationship between West Germany and Israel (Boston: George Allen and Unwin, 1984), 32—86; Kai von Jena, “Versohnung mit Israel? Die deutsch—israelischen Verhandlungen bis zum Wie- dergutmachungsabkommen von 1952,” Vierteljahrsheftefur Zeitgeschichte 34 (1986): 457—80; Yeshayahu A. Jelinek, “Political Acumen, Altruism, Foreign Pressure or Moral Debt: Konrad Adenauer and the ‘Shilumim,’ ” Tel Aviver Jahrbuch fur deutsche Geschichte 19 (1990): 77—102; Tom Segev, The Seventh Million: The Israelis and the Holocaust, trans. Haim Watzman (New York: Hill and Wang, 1994), 189—252; and Frank Stern, The Whitewashing of the Yellow Badge: Antisemitism and Philosemitism in Postwar Germany, trans. William Templer (Oxford: Perga- mon, 1992). On Wiedergutmachung, see the excellent study by Constantin Goschler, Wiedergut- machung: Westdeutschland und die Veifolgten des Nationalsozialismus (19504954) (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1992); also Christian Pross, Wiedergutmachung: Der Kleinkrieg gegen die Opfer (Frankfurt am Main: Athenaum, 1988); Ludolf Herbst and Constantin Goschler, eds., Wiedergutmachung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland (Munich: Oldenbourg, 1989); and Alf Liidtke, “ ‘Coming to Terms with the Past’: Illusions of Remembering, Ways of Forgetting Nazism in West Germany,” Journal of Modern History 65 (1993): 562—70. 6. Norbert Frei, Vergangenheitspolitik: Die Anfa'nge der Bundesrepublik und die NS — Vergang- enheit (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1996); Curt Garner, “Public Service Personnel in West Germany in the 1950s: Controversial Policy Decisions and Their Effects on Social Composition, Gender Structure, and the Role of Former Nazis,” in Robert G. Moeller, ed., West Germany Under Con- struction: Politics, Society, and Culture in the Adenauer Era (Ann Arbor: University of Michi— gan Press, 1997), 135 —95; idem, “Schlussfolgerungen aus der Vergangenheit? Die Auseinan— dersetzungen um die Zukunft des deutschen Berufsbeamtentums nach dem Ende des Zweiten Weltkiieges,” in Hans—Ulrich Volkmann, ed., Ende des Dritten Reiches—Ende des Zweiten Weltkrieges: Eine perspektivistische Riickschau (Munich: Piper, 1995), 607—74; James M. Diehl, The Thanks of the Fatherland: German Veterans after the Second World War (Chapel Hill: Uni- versity of North Carolina Press, 1993); and Ulrich Brochhagen, Nach Nu'rnberg: Vergangen- heitsbewiiltigung und Westintegration in der Ara Adenauer (Hamburg: Junius Verlag, 1994). 7. For a useful introduction, see Gerd R. Ueberschar, ed., Der 20. Juli I 944: Bewertung und Rezeption des deutschen Widerstands gegen das NS—Regime (Cologne: Bund Verlag, 1994). 8. Kurt W. Bohme, Die deutschen Kriegsgefangenen in sowjetischer Hand: Eine Bilanz (Bielefeld: Verlag Ernst and Werner Gieseking, 1966), 151. A lower estimate of 2,300,000 is of- fered by Stefan Karner, “Verlorene J ahre: Deutsche Kriegsgefangene und Internierte im Archipel NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE 103 GUPWI,” in Hans der Geschichte, ed., Kriegsgefangene—Wojennoplennyje: Sowjetische Kriegs- gefangene in Deutschland, Deutsche Kriegsgefangene in der Sowjetunion (Dusseldorf: Droste Verlag, 1995), 59; also idem, ImArchipel GUPVI: Kriegsgefangenschafi und Internierung in der Sowjetunion 1941—1956 (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1995), 9. Recent revelations in Russian archives may call for an upward revision of the number of prisoners of war and suggest that all previous counts are estimates at best. See Gunther Wagenlehner, “Zweimal einem Wahn geopf— ert,” Das Parlament, Nr. 18~19, 28 April/ 5 May 1995, 7. In general, on expellees, see Gerhard Reichling, “Flucht und Vertreibung der Deutschen: Statistische Grundlage und terminologische Probleme,” in Rainer Schulze, Doris von der Brelie—Lewien, Helga Grebing, eds., Fluchtlinge and Vertriebene in der westdeutschen Nachkriegsgeschichte: Bilanzierung der Forschung und Perspektivenfu'r die kunftige F orschungsarbeit (Hildesheim: Verlag August Lax, 1987), 46—56. 9. VDBIZ (1.) Deutscher Bundestag, 5. Sitzung, 20 September 1949, 27—29. 10. Quoted in Rolf Vogel, ed., Deutschlands Weg nach Israel: Eine Dokumentation mit einem Geleitwort von Konrad Adenauer (Stuttgart: Seewald Verlag, 1967), 36. See also the references above in note 5. 11. See Stern, Whitewashing, 372; and Michael Wolffsohn, “Das Wiedergutmachungs- abkommen mit Israel: Eine Untersuchung bundesdeutscher und auslandischer Umfragen,” in Lu- dolf Herbst, ed., Westdeutschland 1945—1955: Unterwerfung, Kontrolle, Integration (Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1986), 206—7. 12. The chief advocate of the position that Adenauer had little to gain from the Allies and acted out of genuine moral convictions is Michael Wolffsohn. See, for example, Wolffsohn, “Globalentsch'adigung fur Israel und die Juden? Adenauer und die Opposition in der Bun— desregierung,” in Herbst and Goschler, Wiedergutmachung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, 171—89. Most other interpretations place a far greater emphasis on the international context in general and American pressure in particular. See, for example, Jelinek, “Political Acumen.” 13. In general, see Goschler, Wiedergutmachung; also Michael Burleigh and Wolfgang Wip— permann, The Racial State: Germany, I 933 —I 945 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 125—57; Robert G. Moeller, “The Homosexual Man Is a ‘Man,’ the Homosexual Woman is a ‘Woman’: Sex, Society, and the Law in Postwar West Germany,” in Moeller, ed., West Ger- many Under Construction, 251—84; and Lutz Wiegand, "Kriegsfolgengesetzgebung in der Bun- desrepublik Deutschland,” Archivfur Sozialgeschichte 35 (1995): 73 —~77. 14. Anson Rabinbach, “The Jewish Question in the German Question,” in Peter Baldwin, ed., Reworking the Past: Hitler, the Holocaust, and the Historians’Debate (Boston: Beacon Press, 1990), 49—51. See also Omer Bartov, “Defining Enemies, Making Victims: Germans, Jews, and the Holocaust,” American Historical Review 103 (1998): 771—816; and idem, Mirrors of De- struction: War, Genocide, and Modern Identity (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000). 15. Goschler, Wiedergutmachung, 94, 169—~70, 201. 16. VDBT, (1.) Deutscher Bundestag, 252. Sitzung, 4 March 1953, 12084—90; VDBZ 254. Sitzung, 18 March 1953, 12236—51. 17. Konrad Wittmann, VDBZ (1.) Deutscher Bundestag, 115. Sitzung, 31 January 1951, 4374. Wittmann had been expelled from the Sudetenland after the war. 18. Hiitter, VDBT (1.) Deutscher Bundestag, 271. Sitzung, 12 June 1953, 13430. 19. Marlis G. Steinert, Hitler’s War and the Germans: Public Mood and Attitude during the Second World War; ed. and trans. Thomas E. J. de Witt (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1977), 287; and Wolfram Wette, “Das Russlandbild in der NS—Propaganda: Ein Proble- maufriss,” in Hans—Erich Volkmann, ed., Das Russlandbild im Dritten Reich (Cologne: Bohlau, 1994), 75. 20. Goschler, Wiedergutmachung, 203. 21. See, for example, Richard Reitzner, VDBT, (1.) Deutscher Bundestag, 254. Sitzung, 18 104 NOTES To CHAPTER THREE March 1953, 12236. Reitzner had been active in the Czech Social Democratic party until his em- igration to England in 1938. 22. In general, on the ways in which opposition to Allied occupation provided a basis for unity that spanned the political spectrum, see Barbara Marshall, “German Attitudes to British Military Government 1945—1947,” Journal of Contemporary History 15 (1980): 655—84; and Josef Fo- schepoth, “German Reaction to Defeat and Occupation,” in Moeller, ed., West Germany Under Construction, 73 — 89. 23. Representative of the ubiquitous charge that the Potsdam Agreement had created the enor- mous expellee problem are the comments of Eugen Gerstenmaier, VDBT, 48. Sitzung, 17 March 1950, 1657. 24. Hans Merten, VDBT, (1.) Deutscher Bundestag, 233. Sitzung, 9 October 1952, 10680. I am much indebted to Diehl’s insightful analysis. See also Michael L. Hughes, “Restitution and Democracy in Germany after Two World Wars,” Contemporary European History 4 (1994): 1— 18; idem, Shouldering the Burdens of Defeat: West Germany and the Reconstruction of Social Justice (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1999); and Reinhold Schillinger, Der Entseheidungsprozess heim Lastenausgleieh 19454952 (St. Katharinen: Scripta—Mercatu- rae,1985). 25. Hans Gunter Hockerts, “Integration der Gesellschaft: Griindungskrise und Sozialpolitik in der frtihen Bundesrepublik,” Zeitschriftfur Sozialreform 32 (1986): 25—41; and on the law to “equalize burdens,” see Schillinger, Entscheidungsprozess. 26. Detailed studies of the Lastenausgleichsgesetz are offered by Schillinger, Entscheidungs- prozess; and Hughes, Shouldering the Burdens of Defeat; see also Wiegand, “Kriegsfolgenge— setzgebung,” 77—90. And on measures for veterans, see Diehl, Thanks of the Fatherland. 27. On Weimar, see Michael L. Hughes, Paying for the German Inflation (Chapel Hill: Uni— versity of North Carolina Press, 1988); and Hughes, “Restitution and Democracy.” 28. Diehl provides an excellent account of those organizations that represented veteran in— terests; on expellee organizations, see also Schillinger, Entscheidungsprozess, 150—51, 183—86, 204; Hughes, Shouldering the Burdens of Defeat; Marx Hildebert Boehm, “Gruppenbildung und Organisationswesen,” in Eugen Lemberg and Friedrich Edding, eds., Die Vertriebenen in West— deutschland: Ihre Eingliederung und ihr Einfluss auf Gesellschaft, Wirtschaft, Politik und Gei— stesleben, 3 vols. (Kiel: Ferdinand Hirt, 1959), 1:523—605; Wolf Donner, Die sozial— und staats— politische Ta‘tigkeit der Kriegsopfewerba‘nde (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 1960); Hermann Weiss, “Die Organisation der Vertriebenen und ihre Presse,” in Wolfgang Benz, ed., Die Vertrei- bung der Deutschen aus dem Osten: Ursache, Ereignisse, Folgen (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 1985), 193—202; Pertti [Tapio] Ahonen, “Domestic Constraints on West German Ostpolitik: The Role of the Expellee Organizations'in the Adenauer Era,” Central Eu- ropean History 31 (1998): 31—63; and idem, “The Expellee Organizations and West German Ostpolitik, 1949—1969” (PhD. diss., Yale University, 1999). 29. See, for example, Bundesministerium der Finanzen, F luchtlingslasten und Verteidi- gungsbeitrag: Zwei sich erga'nzende und begrenzende Belastungen (n.p., 1951); also Schaffer’s comments, VDBT, (1.) Deutscher Bundestag, 115. Sitzung, 31 January 1951, 4340. 30. Diehl, Thanks of the Fatherland, 242', and on expellees, Everhard Holtmann, “Fltichtlinge in den 50er J ahren: Aspekte ihrer gesellschaftlichen und politischen Integration,” in Axel Schildt and Arnold Sywottek, eds., Modernisierung im Wiederaufhau: Die westdeutsche Gesellschaft der 50er Jahre (Bonn: Verlag J.H.W. Dietz Nachf., 1993), 358—59. 31. See Karl Heinz Gehrmann, “Kulturpflege und Kulturpolitik,” in Lemberg and Edding, Die Vertriebenen, 3:183; Eugen Lemberg, “Das Bildungswesen vor neuen Aufgaben,” in ibid., 3: 383, 385—86, 388—89, 398—99. And for good examples of the scholarly attempts to fill this mandate, see Lemberg and Edding, Die Vertriebenen; and for the general overview of the liter— NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE 105 ature, see Hiddo M. Jolles, Zur Soziologie der Heimatvertriebenen und Fliichtlinge (Cologne' Kjepenheuer and Witsch, 1965), 18—29. ' 32. “Graber und Stacheldraht: Schicksal von Millionen,” Stuttgarter Zeitung 25 October 1950, copy in Bundesarchiv—Militararchiv (Freiburg) (hereafter BAMF), B205/1143. 33. See, for example, government planning for a week of remembrance for POWs in 1950 in Bundesarchiv (Koblenz) (hereafter BAK), B 150/4448, Heft 2; “Zur Kriegsgefangenen—Gedenk— woche,” radio address of President Theodor Heuss, 9 October 1952, BAMF, B205/1043' on the 1953 events, BAK, B150/8076; and in general, Peter Steinbach, “Jenseits von Zeit und,Raum' Krregsgefangenschaft in der Frijhgeschichte der Bundesrepublik Deutschland ” Universitas (1990): 638. , 34. See “Complaint of Failure on the Part of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to Repa- triate or Otherwise Account for Prisoners of War Retained in Soviet Territory,” United Nations General Assembly, Fifth Session, Third Committee, Agenda item 67, 7 December 1950 Politi— sches Archiv des Auswartigen Amtes, Abt. 2/2073; also Karner, Archipel GUPVI 201,—4 See also Frank Biess’s contribution to this volume, and Biess, “The Protracted War: Returning POWs :15?) she Making of East and West German Citizens, 1945 ~1955” (Ph.D. diss., Brown University, I 3 35. Jorn Riisen, “Continuity, Innovation, and Self—Reflection in Late Historicism: Theodor Schieder (1908~1984),” in Hartmut Lehmann and James Van Horn Melton, eds., Paths of Con- tinuity: Central European Historiography from the 1930s to the I950s (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 353—88. 36. Klemens von Klemperer, “Hans Rothfels (1891—1976),” in Lehmann and Melton eds Paths of Continuity, 127—32. ’ I, 37. For useful reviews of postwar West German historiography, see James Van Horn Melton “Introduction: Continuities in German Historical Scholarship, 1930—1960,” in Lehmann and Melton, eds., Paths of Continuity, 1—88; Winfried Schulze, “German Historiography from the 1930s to the 1950s,” in ibid., 19—42. 38. On the background of the documentation project, see Matthias Beer, “Die Dokumentation der Vertreibung der Deutschen aus Ost—Mitteleuropa: Hintergrijnde—Entstehung—Wirkung ” Geschichte in Wissenschaft und Unterricht 50 (1999): 99~ll7; idem, “Im Spannungsfeld voh Politik und Zeitgeschichte: Das Grossforschungsprojekt ‘Dokumentation der Vertreibung der Deutschen aus Ost—Mitteleuropa.’” Vierteljahrsheftefiir Zeitgeschichte 49 (1998): 345—89' and 1dem, “Der ‘Neuanfang’ der Zeitgeschichte nach 1945: Zum Verhaltnis von nationalsozialistischer Umsiedlungs— und Vernichtungspolitik und der Vertreibung der Deutschen aus Ostmitteleuropa ” 1n Deutsche H istoriker im Nationalsozialismus, ed. Winfried Schulze and Otto Gerhard Oexle with the assistance of Gerd Helm and Thomas Ott (Frankfurt am Main. Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag 1999), 274—301. The entire series, published under the auspices of the Bundesministerium fiii‘ Vertriebene, Fliichtlinge und Kriegsgeschadigte, is entitled Dokumentation der Vertreibung der Deutschen aus Ost-Mitteleuropa. The individual volumes, each prepared by a different team of members of the project but all appearing under the general editorship of Theodor Schieder in- clude Vol. I, Die Vertreibung der deutschen Bevolkerung aus den Gebieten ostlich der Oder-Neisse (Grosse-Denkte: Grenzland-Dmckerei Rock, n.d. [1953]); Vol. II, Das Schicksal der Deutschen in Ungarn (Dusseldorf: Oskar Leiner—Diuck,l956); Vol. [11, Das Sehicksal der Deutschen in Ruma‘nien (Berlin: Bernard and Graefe, 1957); Vol. IV, Die Vertreibung der deutschen Bevol- kerung aus der Tschechoslowakei (Berlin: Heyn’s Erben, 1957); Vol. V, Das Schicksal der Deutschen in Jugoslawien (Dusseldorf: Oskar—Leiner—Druck,1961); Kathe von Normann Ein Tagehuch aus Pommern 19454946 (Gross-Denkte: Grenzland—Druckerei, 1955)‘ Margarete Schell, Ein Tagebuch aus Prag 1945—46 (Kassel—Wilhelmshohe: Herbert M. Nuhr,,1957)' and Hans Graf von Lehndorff, Ein Bericht aus 0st— und Westpreussen 1945—1947 (Dusseldorf: Oskar— 106 NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE Leiner-Druck, 1960). In general, on the background of the project, see Josef Henke, “Exodus aus Ostpreussen und Schlesien: Vier Erlebnisberichte,” in Benz, ed., Die Vertreibung der Deutschen aus dem Osten, 91. In the following, I have indicated the authors of individual accounts, the date the account was written, and the volume in which it appears. 39. Oder—Neisse, I/1:iii—iv, vi. And on the geographic distribution of the testimonies, see Kul- turstiftung der deutschen Vertriebenen, ed., Vertreibnng and Vertreibungsverbrechen 1945—1948 (Meckenheim: DCM Druck Center, 1989), 101—5. 40. “Dokumente des Grauens,” Stuttgarter Zeitung, 2 September 1954, copy in BAK, B 150/ 5641. 41. “Die deutsche Tragodie,” Westflilische Zeitung, 30 October 1957; and “Zeitgeschichte in Dokumenten,” Westdentsche Allgemeine, 5 September 1958, copies in BAK, B150/ 5643. 42. For example, “Bericht des ehemaligen Bezirksbfirgeinieisters H. aus Breslau: Beglau~ bigte Abschrift (1946),” Oder-Neisse, I/2:327—36. This was an exceptional testimony because H. identified himself as a Jew and an “antifascist” and because he had been put in his position as mayor by the Russian forces. For a fuller discussion of the documentation project, see Robert G. Moeller, War Stories: The Search for a Usable Past in the Federal Republic of Germany (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2000). 43. Carl Schuster, “Kriegsgefangene schreiben Zeitgeschichte,” Aachener Volkszeitung, 19 April 1961, copy in BAMF, B205/6. See “Entwurf fur eine ‘Dokumentation des Schicksals der deutschen Gefangenen des 2. Weltkrieges,’ ” prepared by the Ministry for Expellees, Refugees, and War—Damaged, 23 May 1957, BAMF, B205/ 1720a. 44. See the notes on the discussion of the documentation staff in Munich, 14 January 1958, BAMF, B205/1754. 45. On Maschke’s background, including his service in the educational and political work of the Nazi party and the SA, see Michael Burleigh, Germany Turns Eastwards: A Study of “0st— forschung” in the Third Reich (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 137. 46. Erich Maschke, “Deutsche Kriegsgefangenengeschichte: Der Gang der Forschung,” in Erich Maschke, ed., Die deutschen Kriegsgefangenen des zweiten Weltkrieges: Eine Zusam- menfassung (Munich: Verlag Ernst and Werner Gieseking, 1974), 3—37; and idem, “Quellen und Methoden,” ibid., 41—59; and Steinbach, “Jenseits von Zeit und Raum,” 637—49. 47. In general, see Arthur L. Smith, Heimkehr aus dem Zweiten Weltkrieg: Die Entlassung aler deutschen Kriegsgefangenen (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1985), 151—69; and Die- ter Bach and Jochen Leyendecker, eds., “Ich habe geweint vor Hunger”: Deutsche and miss- ische Gefangene in Lagern des zweiten Weltkriegs (Wuppertal: Peter Hammer Verlag, 1993). The analysis offered here is based only on the volumes that describe conditions in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. 48. See in particular, Hedwig Fleischhacker, Die deutschen Kriegsgefangenen in der Sowjet- union: Der Faktor Hunger (Bielefeld: Verlag Ernst and Werner Gieseking, 1965). 49. Erich Maschke, “Grundzfige der sowjetischen Wirtschaftsgeschichte bis 1955: Der Rah— men der deutschen Kiiegsgefangenschaft,” in Werner Ratza, ed., Die deutschen Kriegsgefang- enen in der Sowjetunion: Der FaktorArbeit (Bielefeld: Ernst and Werner Gieseking, 1973), xiii. Quotation in Diether Cartellieri, Die deutschen Kriegsgefangenen in der Sowjetimion: Die Lagergesellschafi: Eine Untersuchung der zwischenmenschliehen Beziehungen in den Kriegs- gefangenenlagern (Bielefeld: Ernst and Werner Gieseking, 1967), 253, 259—60. 50. Bohme, Die deutschen Kriegsgefangenen, 151, 282—300. 51. Wolfgang Schwarz, Die deutschen Kriegsgefangenen in der Sowjetunion: Aus dem kul— turellen Leben (Bielefeld: Ernst and Werner Gieseking, 1969), 34; and “Erlebnisbericht der Schneiderin Anna Schwartz aus Schonberge, Kreis Karthaus i. Westpreussen 5. Juni 1952,” Oder—Neisse, 1/22103. NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE 107 52. Schell, Ein Tagebuch, 50, 106; also “Erlebnisbericht der Hausfrau A.F. aus Konigsberg i. Ostpreussen 25. November 1952,” Oder-Neisse, I/ 1: 130; also Diehl, Thanks of the Fatherland, 231. And on the intersecting fates of POWs and expellees, see, for example, Michael Reck, Tagebuch aus sowjetischer Kriegsgefangenschafi 1945—1949: Aufzeichnungen, Beiheft 1, Zur Geschichte der deutschen Kriegsgefangenen des zweiten Weltkrieges, ed. Erich Maschke (Biele— feld: Ernst and Werner Gieseking, 1967), 14;‘and “Erlebnisbericht der Regierungsangestellten Elisabeth Erbrich aus Breslau . . .April 1946,” Oder-Neisse, 1/12444. 53. See the suggestive comments of Utz J eggle, “Sage and Verbrechen,” in Schulze, Brelie— Lewien, Grebing, Fliichtlinge imd Vertriebene, 201—6; also, Albrecht Lehmann, Im F remden ungewollt zuhaas: Fliichtlinge and Vertriebene in Westdeutschland (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1991), 240—41; Alexander von Plato, “Fremde Heimat: Zur Integration von Flfichtlingen und Ein- heimischen in die neue Zeit,” in Lutz Niethammer and Alexander von Plato, eds, “Wir kriegen jetzt andere Zeiten”: Aufder Suche nach der Erfahrung des Volkes in nachfaschistischen dern (Berlin: J .H.W. Dietz Nachf., 1985), 198—99; and the parallels in women’s memoirs sug- gested by Elizabeth Heineman in this volume; and Robert G. Moeller, Protecting Motherhood: Women and the Family in the Politics of Postwar West Germany (Berkeley: University of Cali- fornia Press, 1993), 8—14. * 54. “Erlebnisbericht der Frau Maria Zatschek aus Briinn” (no date), Tschechoslowakei, IV/ 2:439; see also, for example, “Bericht des Studienrats Dr. rer. nat. Hans Enders aus Saaz . . . 15. November 1946,” ibid., lV/2: 300. 55. Schwarz, Die deutschen Kriegsgefangenen, 34. 56. Editor’s introduction, Tschechoslowakei, IV/ 1: 81; see also editor’s introduction, Oder- Neisse, I/1:111E. See also, “Bericht des Kaufmanns E.M. aus Saaz . . . November 1945 ,” Tsche- choslowakei, IV/ 2:313, and note 2, ibid. 57. “Bericht des Kaplan Paul Pfuhl aus Filipovo . . . Original, 19. Oktober 1956,” Jugoslaw- ien, V:261. 58. Schell, Ein Tagebuch, 34 n. 1; and “Bericht des Organisationssekretars Roman Wirkner aus Tetschen: Original, 1957,” Tschechoslowakei, IV/22527. 59. “Erlebnisbericht (Brief) des Kaufmanns und ehemaligen Stadtrats Hubert Schiitz sen. aus Jagerndorf: Beglaubigte Abschrift . . . 4. Januar 1947,” Tschechoslowakei, IV/2:216. 60. Maschke, “Deutsche Kriegsgefangenengeschichte,” 34—37; and Albrecht Lehmann, Gefangenschafi‘ undHeimkehr: Deutsche Kriegsgefangene in der Sowjetunion (Munich: C. H. Beck, 1986), 168—69. 61. Erich Maschke, “Das Schicksal der deutschen Kriegsgefangenen des Zweiten Welt— krieges als Aufgabe zeitgeschichtlicher Forschung,” in Kurt W. Bohme, ed., Die deutschen Kriegsgefangenen in Jugoslawien 1941—1949, vol. 1, part 1 (Bielefeld: Ernst und Werner Giese- king, 1962), xi. 62. On the importance of this recognition, which was denied other groups of victims, see William G. Niederland, “Die verkannten Opfer: Spate Entsch‘adigung fiir seelische Schaden,” in Goschler and Herbst, Wiea'ergutmachnng, 359; and Ulrich Herbert, “Nicht entschadigungsfahig? Die Wiedergutmachungsanspruche der Ausl'ander,” in ibid., 302. 63. Louis Ferdinand Helbig, Der ungeheure Verlast: F lucht and Vertreibung in der deutsch- sprachigen Belletristik der Naehkriegszeit (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1988); and Karl Heinz Gehrmann, “Versuche der literarischen Bewaltigung,” in Lernberg and Edding, Die Vertriebenen, 3:273—317. On the work of the Verband der Heimkehrer, the most important organization of returning POWs, see Verband der Heimkehrer, Kriegsgefangenen und Vermiss- tenangehorigen Deutschlands, ed., F reiheit ohne F urcht: Zehn Jahre Heimkehrerverband (n.p., n.d. [1960]); and idem, Wir mahnen: Kriegsgefangenschaft als Erlebnis undAufgabe (n.p., n.d.). 64. See Schieder, “Gutachten fiber eine Dokumentation,” 1 October 1951, BAK B 150/4171/ 108 NOTES To CHAPTER THREE Heft 1; “Aufzeichnung fiber die Besprechung fiber die Fortfiihrung der Dokumentation im Bundesrninisterium fiir Vertriebene am 13.7.51,” ibid. 65. See, for example, Heinz-Arndt Bruggemann, “Zwei Hande waren wie ein Symbol,” West- deutsche Allgemeine, 10 October 1955; Rudolf Weschinsky, “Alle Herzen sagen: Willkommen in der Heimat,” HamburgerAbendblatt, 10 October 1955; and Dietrich Schwarzkopf, “ ‘Jetzt bist du ein freier deutscher Burger,’ ” Der Tagesspiegel, 15 October 1955', and in general, Robert G. Moeller, “ ‘The Last Soldiers of the Great War’: Tales of Family Reunions in the Federal Republic of Germany,” Signs 24 (1998): 129—45; and Frank Biess’s contribution to this volume. 66. Hans—Peter Schwarz, Die Ara Adenauer: Grilnderjahre der Republik 1949~1957 (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt, 1981), 279; also Josef Foschepoth, “Adenauers Moskau- i'eise 1955,” Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte B22 (1986): 30—46. 67. Quotations are from Heide Fehrenbach, Cinema in a Democratizing Germany: Recon- structing National Identity after Hitler (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1995), 153; see also Gerhard Bliersbach, So gru'n war die Heide: Der Nachkriegsfilm in neuer Sicht (Weinheim: Beltz Verlag, 1985), 39—41; Willi Hofig, Der deutsche Heimatfilm 1947—1960 (Stuttgart: Ferdinand Enke, 1973), 279; and Anton Kaes, From Hitler to Heimat: The Return of History as Film (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989), 14—15. 68. On expellee literature, see the highly sympathetic treatment of Helbig, Der ungeheuere Verlust; also Klaus Weigelt, ed., F lucht und Vertreibung in der Nachkriegsliteratur.‘ F ormen ost- deutseher Kulturforderung (Melle: Verlag Ernst Knoth, 1986). 69. See Jochen Pfeifer, Der deutsche Kriegsroman 1945—1960: Ein Versuch zur Vermittlung von Literatur und Sozialgeschichte (Konigstein: Scriptor, 1981); J ost Hermand, “Darstellungen des Zweiten Weltkrieges,” in lost Hermand, 6d,, Literatur nach 1945, vol. 1, Politische and Re- gionale Aspekte (Wiesbaden: Akademische Verlagsgesellschaft, 1979), 28—39; Hans Wagoner, “Soldaten zwischen Gehorsam und Gewissen: Kriegsromane und -tageb1’icher,” in Hans Wa— gener, ed., Gegenwartsliteratur und Drittes Reich: Deutsche Autoren in derAuseinandersetzung mit der Vergangenheit (Stuttgart: Philipp Reclam jun., 1977), 241—61; Michael Kumpfmfiller, Die Schlacht von Stalingrad: Metamorphosen eines deutschen Mythos (Munich: Wilhelm Fink Verlag, 1995), 199—237; Jens Ebert, ed., Stalingrad: Eine deutsche Legende (Reinbek: Rowohlt, 1992), 96—97; and Gerd Albrecht, “Fern der Wirklichkeit: Deutsche Spielfilme der N achkn'egszeit zum Thema Kriegsgefangenschaft und Heirnkehr,” in Hans der Geschichte, ed., Kriegsgefangene-Wojennoplennyje, 101. 70. For a review of this literature, see Theo J. Schulte, The German Army and Nazi Policies in Occupied Russia (Oxford: Berg, 1989), 3—7; and on the postwar period, Detlef Bald, “ ‘Biirger in Uniform’: Tradition und Neuanfang des Militars in Westdeutschland,” in Schildt and Sywot— tek, Modernisierung im Wiederaufbau, 392—402. 71. Georg Meyer, “Innenpolitische Voraussetzung der westdeutschen Wiederbewaffnung,” in Alexander Fischer, ed., Wiederbewaflnung in Deutschland nach 1945 (Berlin: Duncker and Humblot, 1986), 31—44; and Roland G. Foerster, “Innenpolitische Aspekte der Sicherheit West- deutschlands (1945—1950),” in Milit'argeschichtliches Forschungsamt, ed., Anfa'nge west- deutscher Sicherheitspolitik, vol. 1, Von der Kapitulation bis zum Pleven—Plan (Munich: R. Old- enbourg, 1982), 430, 437, 497, 540, 552—53. 72. “Dokumente des Grauens,” Stuttgarter Zeitung, 2 September 1954; and “Katastrophen der Deutschen-Vertreibung aus dem Osten in Dokumenten,” Westdeutsche Allgemeine, 6 May 1954, copies in BAK, B150/5641. 73. Helmut Peitsch, “Deutschlands Geda'chtnis an seine dunkelste Zeit”: Zur Funktion der Autobiographik in den Westzonen Deutschlands und den Westsektoren von Berlin 1945 bis I 949 (Berlin: Edition Sigma, 1990). 74. Oder-Neisse, I/l:348—50; I/2: 54—56, 57—59, 593—606, 626—46. NOTES TO CHAPTER THREE 109 75. Otto D. Kulka, “Maj or Trends and Tendencies in German Historiography on National So- cialism and the ‘Jewish Question’ (1924—1984),” Yearbook of the Leo Baeek Institute 30 (1985): 222. See also the useful reflections of Dan Diner, “Zwischen Bundesrepublik und Deutschland: Ein Vortrag,” in Hajo Funke, ed., Von der Gnade der geschenkten Nation (Berlin: Rotbuch, 1988), 194—95; and Lfidtke, “Coming to Terms with the Past,” 558—60. Rare exceptions to this rule were Eugen Kogon, Der NS—Staat: Das Systemider deutschen Konzentrationslager (Munich: Im Verlag Alber, 1946); H. G. Adler, Theresienstadt 1941—1945: Das Antlitz einer Zwangsgemein- schafi (Tfibingen: J.C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1955); and idem, Die verheimlichte Wahrheit: Theresienstiidter Dokumente (Tubingen: J .C.B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1958). 76. Hans Rothfels, “Zehn Jahre danach,” Werteljahrsheftefizr Zeitgeschichte 3 (1955): 228, 232, 237. 77. Benedict Anderson, Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Na- tionalism, rev. ed. (London: Verso, 1991), 7. 78. Martin Broszat, Klaus—Dietmar Henke, and Hans Woller, eds., Von Stalingrad zur Wa'hrungsreform: Zur Sozialgeschichte des Umbruehs in Deutschland (Munich: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1988); Lutz Niethammer, “Privat—Wirtschaft: Erinnerungsfragmente einer anderen Umerziehung,” in idem, ed., “Hinterher merkt man, dass es richtig war? dass es schiefgegangen ist”: Nachkriegs—Erfahrungen im Ruhrgebiet (Berlin: J.H.W. Dietz Nachf., 1983), 79—82. 79. A. J. Nicholls, Freedom with Responsibility: The Social Market Economy in Germany, 1918—1963 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994). 80. Alexander Mitscherlich and Margarete Mitscherlich, Die Unfa'higkeit zu trauern: Grund— lagen kollektiven Verhaltens (Munich: R. Piper, 1967), 19. Ihave also benefited greatly from the lucid discussion of Eric L. Santner, Stranded Objects: Mourning, Memory, and Film in Postwar Germany (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990), 1—6. 81. In this volume, see the chapter by Elizabeth Heineman; also Atina Grossmann, “A Ques- tion of Silence: The Rape of German Women by Occupation Soldiers,” in Moeller, ed., West Ger- many Under Construction, 33—52; and Marlene Epp, “The Memory of Violence: Soviet and East European Mennonite Refugees and Rape in the Second World War,” Journal of Women ’s History 9 (1997): 58~87. 82. These topics are treated at greater length in the original version of this article. See my “War Stories,” 1008—11, 1034—48. The Miracle Years A CULTURAL HISTORY OF WEST GERMANY, 1949 — 1968 EDITED BY HANNA SCHISSLER PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS PRINCETON AND OXFORD Copyright © 2001 by Princeton University Press Published by Princeton University Press, 41 William Street, Princeton, New Jersey 08540 In the United Kingdom: Princeton University Press, 3 Market Place, Woodstock, Oxfordshire OX20 ISY All Rights Reserved TO MY MOTHER AND TO THE MEMORY OF MY FATHER Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data W H O N E V E R M I S L E D M E A B O U T The miracle years : a cultural history of West Germany, 1949~1968 / edited by Hanna Schissler. p'cm. THE RECENT GERMAN PAST Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 0—691—05819—9 (alk. paper)-ISBN 0-691—05820—2 (pbk. : alk. paper) 1. Germany (West)—Social life and customs. 2. Germany (West)—Ethnic relations. 3. Racism—Germany (West) 4. Germany (West)—Cultura1 policy. 5. Holocaust, Jewish (1939—1945)——Psychological aspects. 1. Schissler, Hanna. DD258.7 .M57 2001 943.087—dc21 00-039974 _ E_-i..-._m_..(9....i._...t._,._._m ,. This book has been composed in Times Roman The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of ANSI/NISO 23948-1992 (1997) (Permanence of Paper) www.pupress.princeton.edu "Aw—runnwu A Ewan/Md .4... ._...M.~«_ Printed in the United States of America 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 l 10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 l (Pbk.) ALD The miracle years DD 258.7 .M57 2 01 ...
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