82 3043 029 7834 071 5876 6864 029 11074 071 6596

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Unformatted text preview: ayoff; probability) Auditor’s payoffs Expected payoff No penalty (payoff; probability) Penalty (payoff; probability) Manager Selects the Nash Fraud Level Manager Selects the Cheat Fraud Level 46.82 30.43; 0.29 78.34; 0.71 58.76 68.64; 0.29 110.74; 0.71 65.96 113.75; 0.29 139.29; 0.71 22.32 53.61; 0.81 111.42; 0.19 8.51 53.61; 0.81 184.29; 0.19 3.67 53.61; 0.81 248.49; 0.19 32.89 30.43; 0.42 78.34; 0.58 35.78 68.64; 0.42 110.74; 0.58 33.55 113.75; 0.42 139.29; 0.58 21.08 46.73; 0.84 118.31; 0.16 9.75 46.73; 0.84 191.17; 0.16 0.22 46.73; 0.84 255.37; 0.16 20.62 30.43; 0.53 78.34; 0.47 15.55 –68.64; 0.53 110.74; 0.47 5.01 113.75; 0.53 139.29; 0.47 17.92 38.60; 0.87 126.44; 0.13 8.79 38.60; 0.87 199.30; 0.13 0.74 38.60; 0.87 263.50; 0.13 The nine audit / fraud combinations show the expected payoffs for both the manager and auditor, and the payoff and probability components that produce the expected payoffs. King—Investigation of Self-Serving Biases in an Auditing Trust Game 269 lowest cost,...
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