Auditors do exhibit self serving bias in my setting

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Unformatted text preview: aud Index Average Fraud Index for: Regular Play Rounds Resolution Play Rounds Difference Panel C: Average Payoff Differences Average Payoff Difference for Regular Play Rounds Average Payoff Difference for Resolution Play Rounds Effect of Resolution Phase a n 11 in each of the four settings: no puffery / weak group; no puffery / strong group; yes puffery / weak group; yes puffery / strong group. Audit, fraud, and payoff indexes are defined in Table 3. b The p-values are based on two-tailed approximate randomization tests. experimental environment that follows Kachelmeier’s (1996a) suggestion to incorporate both economic and psychological forces. Auditors do exhibit self-serving bias in my setting; however, auditor group affiliation neutralizes this bias. My research makes two primary contributions. First, it challenges the Bazerman et al. (1997) conclusion that auditors cannot be independent because they fall prey to self-serving biases. Although my results suggest that self-serving bias can arise, noneconomic forces such as group affiliations can help counter such biases. One implic...
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This note was uploaded on 01/27/2014 for the course ACCY 405 taught by Professor Staff during the Fall '08 term at University of Illinois, Urbana Champaign.

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