That is auditors increase their audit level to avoid

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Unformatted text preview: hen their choices should not differ across the SG and WG settings, as predicted by H3 (Null) shown below. The alternative hypothesis predicts that the SG treatment creates psychological forces that reduce auditors’ trust of managers in the SG settings relative to the WG settings. There are two possible forces inherent in the SG treatment. First, auditors may attach a psychological cost from seeing their name posted publicly and, thus, the treatment may induce auditors to increase audit levels in an attempt to avoid this psychologically costly outcome. That is, auditors increase their audit level to avoid a potential ‘‘loss of face’’ associated with the public identification created by mistakenly trusting their manager-partner (Kachelmeier and Shehata 1997). The second reason the SG treatment may reduce auditors’ trust of managers is that the SG treatment may create a team identity that motivates auditors to focus more on their collective goal of conducting appropriate audits than on their individual self-interested motives (Abrams and Hogg 1999). Both of these psychological forces may reduce auditors’ tru...
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