Unformatted text preview: ation is that accounting
ﬁrms should continue to create and maintain strong group cohesion among audit teams,
and to encourage auditors to afﬁliate with professional organizations.
A second contribution is the development of an experimental setting that incorporates
key (stylized) features of the audit environment: (1) auditors beneﬁt from trustworthy clients, but auditors may not be able to determine the client’s true trustworthiness in the short King—Investigation of Self-Serving Biases in an Auditing Trust Game 283 run, and (2) asymmetric incentives and information between the manager and the auditor
create ambiguity about the other player’s incentives. This is a parsimonious setting for
investigating audit-quality issues with both economic and noneconomic components.
Like all research, this study is subject to several limitations. First, I used speciﬁc
functions and parameter values to operationalize the theory for my experimental setting,
and it is not clear how sensitive the ﬁndings are to these selected values. Second, the setting
has a game-theoretic...
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