Effects some illustrave simulaons varying combina0ons

Info iconThis preview shows page 1. Sign up to view the full content.

View Full Document Right Arrow Icon
This is the end of the preview. Sign up to access the rest of the document.

Unformatted text preview: steps and update schedule, update uninfected ver0ces –  Pick v, compute f and flip biased coin; if infec0on, compute g and flip biased coin to choose R/B •  General condi0ons on f: f(0) = 0, f(1) = 1, f increasing •  General condi0ons on g: g(0) = 0, g(1)= 1, 1 ­g(x) = g(1 ­x), g increasing •  Obtain broad class of behaviors by varying G, K_R, K_B, f and g Sample Switching Func&ons r < 1: f concave, faster adoption r > 1: f convex, slower adoption Sample Selec&on Func&ons s < 1: g “equalizing”, weak platform effects s > 1: g “polarizing”, strong platform effects Some Illustra&ve Simula&ons •  Varying combina0ons of: –  linear/concave/convex switching func0ons f –  linear/polarizing/equalizing selec0on func0ons g –  graph structures: Erdos ­Renyi and Preferen0al Agachment trees •  Slight budget advantage for Red •  Random (non ­strategic) ini0al infec0ons •  Roll the tapes… Interes&ng Ques&ons •  How do graph structure, f and g influence equilibrium proper0es? –  We don’t know a lot here yet. •  How high can the Price of Anarchy be? –  Max social welfare vs. equilibrium welfare •  How high can the Price of Budgets be? –  Imbalance of payoffs at equilibrium vs. imbalance of ini0al budgets...
View Full Document

This document was uploaded on 02/03/2014.

Ask a homework question - tutors are online