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Unformatted text preview: ch edges to purchase. a. Consider a network that is a simple cycle over the N players. Are there values for the edge cost c such that this network is an equilibrium of the formation game? If not, why not? If so, which value(s) of c? b. Consider a network that is a line or chain over the N players: 1 ‐‐‐ 2 ‐‐‐ 3 ‐‐‐ 4 ‐‐‐ 5 ‐‐‐ … ‐‐‐ N‐1 ‐‐‐ N Suppose that c = N/4. Is it possible for this network to be an equilibrium? If not, why not? If so, describe who would purchase which edges at equilibrium. c. Repeat part (b) but for edge cost c = 3N/4. d. Suppose that c = 6 and that N is very large. Consider the “universal” structural properties of social networks we discussed in the first half of the course: small diameter, heavy‐tailed degree distributions and high clustering coefficient. For each of these properties,...
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 Spring '14

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