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19 p a g e high speed rail affirmative high speed rail

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Unformatted text preview: rd J. Shatz, Public Policy Institute of California, 2006 (Protecting the Nation’s Seaports: Balancing Security and Costs, www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/r_606jhr.pdf) Each container trip to the United States has, on average, 17 different stops, or points at which the container’s journey temporarily halts. The adage “goods at rest are goods at risk” readily applies to the terrorist threat. The container will be at rest at any point in the journey that involves a change in mode of transportation. While at rest, the container is vulnerable to thieves and terrorists alike. Providing port security therefore involves closely scrutinizing activities not only at the port but at points all along the shipping chain. The truck driver picking up the container at the U.S. port, often poorly paid and possibly an illegal immigrant not well integrated into U.S. society may himself represent vulnerability in the system. [___] Port Security is not infrastructure Jon D. Haveman and Howard J. Shatz, Public Policy Institute of California, 2006 (Protecting the Nation’s Seaports: Balancing Security and Costs, www.ppic.org/content/pubs/report/r_606jhr.pdf) There is no way to completely inspect all of the millions of containers entering the United States. They are about as large as a full- size moving van and are often tightly packed. Inspecting each thoroughly would bring commerce to a halt, exactly the kind of reaction that terrorists hope to generate. Given the difficulties of complete inspection, defense needs to be layer ed, with checks at multiple stages on a container’s journey. Even if a check at one stage has a low probability of uncovering a problem, multiple checks throughout the supply chain raise that probability a great deal. Such a layered defense can be divided into five areas: (1) intelligence—gaining information about which containers might be risky, (2) information about contents—having shippers notify authorities about the goods they are shipping, (3) procedural uniformity—creating standard procedures regarding packing and moving goods so that anomalies will be seen more easily, (4) limiting access—enforcing greater control over who may come near containers and ports, and (5) technology—the development of new inspection and tracking technologies. 19 | P a g e High Speed Rail Affirmative High Speed Rail Affirmative BDL High Speed Rail Aff – Table of Contents Summary............................................................................................................................................... 2 Glossary ............................................................................................................................................. 3-4 1AC .................................................................................................................................................... 5-9 Economic Harms Answers to: Private Sector Solves ....................................................................
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This document was uploaded on 02/06/2014.

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