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Unformatted text preview: utions, such as the U.S. Advisory Commission on
Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR), which were dismantled or defunded during the 1980s and
1990s. These institutions sought to foster intergovernmental cooperation and consensus. 6|Page States CP Aff BDL
No Solvency – Federal Government Key Generic [___] Transportation infrastructure is inherently national – only the federal government can
effectively plan and manage it
Rico Maggi, Socioeconomic Institute, University of Zurich, 1992
(Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, “SWISS TRANSPORT POLICY FOR
EUROPE? FEDERALISM AND THE DOMINANCE OF LOCAL ISSUES”)
AS is well known, transport infrastructure has a network character. This has two important
implications in the case of transport policy proposals relating to the national or international road network (for the ease of the argument the analysis will be restricted to ro ad transport, but the
model could easily be adapted to other modes). First, the road network creates spatial
externalities because any single link in a specific location can have impacts on the
national economic development (e.g. if it solves a bottleneck problem of national relevance).
With regard to the national development, these externalities would lead to a suboptimal
provision of (large-scale) transport infrastructure in the case of a federalist solution,
because local or regional units would take a free-rider position. This is the reason why,
traditionally, motorway networks, train systems etc. are planned on a national level. A
second implication of the network character of transport is that the costs and benefits of a
specific transport policy project may be unequally distributed among the nodes of a
network and, moreover, an imbalance may also exist between the areas along the link and
those surrounding the nodes. Thus, (internal) economic benefits will often occur in the
nodes whereas (external) ecological disbenefits are felt in the areas along the links. The
consequence of these externalities is a growing local resistance against the planning and
implementation of national or international transport infrastructure projects. Especially in Austria
and Switzerland, it has also provoked an increasing demand for restrictive regulation of transit
traffic on roads. These distributional aspects become relevant for democratic decision -making.
Given a normal spatial settlement pattern, the majority of the pe ople (voters) will normally live in
the centers (nodes) and the minority in the areas along the links. To find majorities, the
policymakers will therefore usually propose transport projects establishing more
performing links between the big nodes. This solves the externality problems in the case
of simple majority rules. However, if federalist elements are introduced in decision -making
on centrally provided goods (or regulations), the local perspective will become relevant and
may lead to a dominance of local issues in national policy. 7|Page States CP Aff BDL
No Solvency – Race to the Bottom [___] Competitive pressures between states will lead to poor infrastructure development as
they rush to try to attract business
Wallace E. Oa...
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This document was uploaded on 02/06/2014.
- Spring '14