Not only do segregationist policies denial of the

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Unformatted text preview: utions, such as the U.S. Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR), which were dismantled or defunded during the 1980s and 1990s. These institutions sought to foster intergovernmental cooperation and consensus. 6|Page States CP Aff BDL No Solvency – Federal Government Key Generic [___] Transportation infrastructure is inherently national – only the federal government can effectively plan and manage it Rico Maggi, Socioeconomic Institute, University of Zurich, 1992 (Transportation Research Part A: Policy and Practice, “SWISS TRANSPORT POLICY FOR EUROPE? FEDERALISM AND THE DOMINANCE OF LOCAL ISSUES”) AS is well known, transport infrastructure has a network character. This has two important implications in the case of transport policy proposals relating to the national or international road network (for the ease of the argument the analysis will be restricted to ro ad transport, but the model could easily be adapted to other modes). First, the road network creates spatial externalities because any single link in a specific location can have impacts on the national economic development (e.g. if it solves a bottleneck problem of national relevance). With regard to the national development, these externalities would lead to a suboptimal provision of (large-scale) transport infrastructure in the case of a federalist solution, because local or regional units would take a free-rider position. This is the reason why, traditionally, motorway networks, train systems etc. are planned on a national level. A second implication of the network character of transport is that the costs and benefits of a specific transport policy project may be unequally distributed among the nodes of a network and, moreover, an imbalance may also exist between the areas along the link and those surrounding the nodes. Thus, (internal) economic benefits will often occur in the nodes whereas (external) ecological disbenefits are felt in the areas along the links. The consequence of these externalities is a growing local resistance against the planning and implementation of national or international transport infrastructure projects. Especially in Austria and Switzerland, it has also provoked an increasing demand for restrictive regulation of transit traffic on roads. These distributional aspects become relevant for democratic decision -making. Given a normal spatial settlement pattern, the majority of the pe ople (voters) will normally live in the centers (nodes) and the minority in the areas along the links. To find majorities, the policymakers will therefore usually propose transport projects establishing more performing links between the big nodes. This solves the externality problems in the case of simple majority rules. However, if federalist elements are introduced in decision -making on centrally provided goods (or regulations), the local perspective will become relevant and may lead to a dominance of local issues in national policy. 7|Page States CP Aff BDL No Solvency – Race to the Bottom [___] Competitive pressures between states will lead to poor infrastructure development as they rush to try to attract business Wallace E. Oa...
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This document was uploaded on 02/06/2014.

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