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high as possible. Alarmists Zimmerman and Lewis (2006) suggest the entire caper could be pulled off
for $10 million. The conspirators would be lucky to buy off three people with such a paltry sum. Moreover,
the terrorists would be required to expose their ultimate goals to at least some of the corrupted, and at that
point (if not earlier) they would become potential extortion victims. They could not afford to
abandon unreliable people who know their goals (though they could attempt to kill them), and such people would now
enjoy essentially monopoly powers ever to escalate their price. The cost of the operation in bribes alone could
easily become ten times the sum suggested by Zimmerman and Lewis. And even at that, there would be, of course, a
considerable risk that those so purchased would, at an exquisitely opportune moment of their choosing, decide to take
the money and run--perhaps to the authorities representing desperate governments with essentially bottomless bankrolls and an
overwhelming incentive to expend resources to arrest the atomic plot and to capture or kill the scheming perpetrators .
Assessing the financial costs. The discussion so far has neglected to consider the
cumulating, or cascading, entirely, but these could easily 11 | P a g e Port Security Negative BDL
No WMD Terrorism [___] [___] No risk of nuclear terrorism
Jason Sigger, Defense Policy Analyst focusing on Chemical, Biological, and Nuclear Defense issues,
(“Terrorism Experts Can Be Alarmists, Too”, http://armchairgeneralist.typepad.com/my_weblog/ 2010/01/terrorism-experts-can-be-alarmists-too-1.html)
You find the famous bin Laden 1998 quote about WMDs, references from George "slam dunk"
Tenet's book on al Qaeda intentions and actions in the desert, meetings between Muslim scientists
and suppliers, statements by terrorists that were obtained under "interrogations," and yes, even Jose
Padilla's "dirty bomb" - a charge which people may remember the US government dropped
because it had no evidence on this point. And no discussion about AQ would be complete
without the "mobtaker" device that never really emerged in any plot agai nst the West. That is
to say, we have a collection of weak evidence of intent without any feasible capability and zero
WMD incidents - over a period of fifteen years, when AQ was at the top of their game, they
could not develop even a crude CBRN hazard, let alone a WMD capability. Mowatt-Larsen
doesn't attempt to answer the obvious question - why didn't AQ develop this capability by
now? He points to a June 2003 article where the Bush administration reported to the UN Security
Council that there was a "high probability" that al Qaeda would attack with a WMD within two years.
The point that the Bush administration could have been creating a facade for its invasion into Iraq
must have occurred to Mowatt-Larsen, but he dodges the issue. This is an important report to read,
but not for the purposes that the author intended. It demons...
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This document was uploaded on 02/06/2014.
- Spring '14