Varsity-Packet-Final

Npsedunpspubsscholarlytr2007nps 97 07 003pdf the first

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Unformatted text preview: trates the extremely thin thread that so many terrorist experts and scientists hang on when they claim that terrorists are coming straight at the United States with WMD capabilities. 12 | P a g e Port Security Negative BDL No Solvency – Detection [___] [___] No solvency for port shut-downs: If a WMD is detected, the port will be shut-down Lt. Morgan James et al, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007 (Port Security Strategy 2012, edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/TR/2007/NPS-97-07-003.pdf) A detection or activation of a WMD in the port would result in the disruption all port operations. Importation of a WMD provides terrorists the ability to inflict severe damage in the importing country. [___] Detection devices don’t solve direct ship attacks Lt. Morgan James et al, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007 (Port Security Strategy 2012, edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/TR/2007/NPS-97-07-003.pdf) The first scenario considered small boat attacks on ports. Small boats loaded with explosives can penetrate the waterside of the port and detonate in the port vicinity. This action would cause damage to the ports’ systems and equipment and disrupt the normal operations of the port. From the military point of view, a small boat attack would elevate the force protection level of the ship. It would also create psychological effects within the U.S. populace and generate retaliatory outcries. The USS COLE (DDG 67) attack in Yemen in October 2000 and French tanker Limburg’s attack in October 2002 demonstrated the potential major threat from the explosive -laden boats. [___] Bad weather undermines security sensors Lt. Morgan James et al, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007 (Port Security Strategy 2012, edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/TR/2007/NPS-97-07-003.pdf) Weather also determines the effectiveness of the in-place security measures. For example, a rain storm would greatly affect the performance of sensors or communications equipment along with the patrolling profile of the security personnel. 13 | P a g e Port Security Negative BDL No Solvency – Detection [___] [___] Explosives can be divided, making detection impossible Lt. Morgan James et al, Naval Postgraduate School, 2007 (Port Security Strategy 2012, edocs.nps.edu/npspubs/scholarly/TR/2007/NPS-97-07-003.pdf) The first scenario considers an individual or group with the purpose to cause maximum destruction to the port facility and the in-port ship. One way to achieve this goal is to break up the explosive weapons into various parts carried by different shipments into the port. The insider would coordinate the different shipment of weapons by selecting a shipment that is less likely to be marked for inspection. It is difficult to detect any possible existence of weapons since most components can be mixed with other legitimate items such as electronics, machinery and raw manufacturing materials. Alternatively, the random check conducted can also be exploited. Assembly of the weapons would be done by the insider(s) disguised as workers of the port (e.g. machinery operators, dock workers etc). Detonation of explosives would be coordinated in conjunction with the docking of a ship. The explosives could be installed near the bay and cargo landing areas (near to the fuel tanks of the ship). The attack potentially could generate enough fuel explosives to cause substantial destruction to the port. 14 | P a g e Port S...
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