11 in march 2002 a narrow 3 percent majority of hps

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Unformatted text preview: ectiveness of the CEO and the new top management team. 17 Points from “HP Position on Compaq Merger,” p. 4. This document is authorized for use by Xiaolei Cong, from 11/30/2012 to 2/28/2013, in the course: MGMT 237: 001 Management of Technology - Chaudhuri (Spring 2013), University of Pennsylvania. Any unauthorized use or reproduction of this document is strictly prohibited. HP and Compaq Combined: In Search of Scale and Scope, SM-130 p. 11 In March 2002, a narrow 3 percent majority of HP’s shareholders voted to approve the merger. Compaq’s shareholders were far more enthusiastic, voting 9-to-1 in favor of selling the company to HP. However, the drama did not end with the vote. Hewlett accused HP management of using “HP corporate assets to entice and coerce certain financial institutions [Deutsche Bank] to vote in favor of the proposed merger.” HP denied the allegations and in late April 2002, a judged ruled in favor of the company. Very soon after that judgment, the board decided to not renominate Hewlett; for the first time since its founding, there was no member of the Hewlett or Packard family serving with the company. CREATING AN INTEGRATION PROCESS In deciding to acquire Compaq, HP would create a company with $80 billion in revenue, with over 155,000 employees with a presence in 178 countries. The company had few successful mergers to emulate, either in their own separate histories or in the technology industry in general. HP and Compaq would have to create their own processes, procedures and culture to meet their ambitious targets. From her earlier efforts to radically change HP’s structure in 1999-2000, Fiorina had learned the importance of managing change with “massive inspection and discipline,” and she was determined to heed these lessons: “When we approached the Compaq integration, which was a massive change, I used the phrase over and over again: ‘We will over-gun this, not under-gun it.’ When in doubt I will over-gun it, because we’ve got to do it right. So we put massive discipline and inspection around it.” Due Diligence: Assessing the Cultural Differences Fiorina’s ability to convince internal skeptics, s...
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This document was uploaded on 02/16/2014 for the course MGMT 237 at UPenn.

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