Similarly to cmt he agrees that certain metaphors eg

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Unformatted text preview: of language. For this reason, they have an effect over and above what would accompany the accomplishment of the intended effect (Sadock 1993: 43). This clearly suggests that catachresis (Goatly’s metaphor in its Gap-filling function, Lakoff’s everyday metaphor) cannot be subsumed under the concept of metaphor as understood by Sadock. He also supports the pragmatic approach to figurative language and claims that its understanding follows from the hearer’s assumption that the Gricean Cooperation Principle is always in force. Similarly to CMT, he agrees that certain metaphors, e.g. understanding time in terms of space, may not only be a linguistic phenomenon, but rather a cognitive universal. Ortony (1993) acknowledges this terminological difference and points out that the word metaphor is used in present-day cognitive research in two meanings: as a superordinate term for all figurative or imagistic use of language, and as a co-hyponym of other similar terms, such as catachresis, metonymy, simile and others. In the Lakoffian tradition it is Conceptual metaphor and its implications for discourse 31 also used as a name for cognitive processes (conceptual metaphor), the evidence for which are networks of linguistic metaphors (see Goatly’s root analogies). Black (1993: 20) also notices this trend and comments: A related inflationary thrust is shown in a persistent tendency (…) to regard all figurative uses of language as metaphorical, and in this way to ignore the important distinctions between metaphor and such other figures of speech as simile, metonymy, synecdoche. He also rejects the division into dead and live metaphors: … the only entrenched classification is grounded in the trite opposition (itself expressed metaphorically) between “dead” and “live” metaphors. It is no more helpful than, say, treating a corpse as a special case of a person: A so called dead metaphor is not a metaphor at all, but merely an expression that no longer has a pregnant metaphorical use. (…) one might consider replacing the dead and alive contrast by a set of finer discriminations: distinguishing perhaps between expressions whose etymologies, genuine or fancied, suggest a metaphor beyond resuscitation (a muscle as a little mouse, muculus), those where the original, now usually unnoticed, metaphor can be usefully restored (obligation as involving some kind of bondage); and those, the object of my present interest, that are, and are perceived to be, actively metaphoric (Black 1993: 25).12 Black’s most important contribution to the study of metaphor, though, is not his participation in a terminological discussion, but his interactionist theory of metaphor, which he summarizes as follows: 1. A metaphorical statement has two distinct subjects, to be identified as “primary” and “secondary” one. (…) 2. The secondary subject is to be regarded as a system rather than an individual thing. (…) In retrospect, the intended emphasis upon “systems”, rather than upon “things” or “ideas” (as in Richards)...
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