Deterrence Theory

paradoxes of deterrence mutual hurt in threatening

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Unformatted text preview: Example: I will beat you over the head with the club until you do what I want Assurances – the compellent action will stop when you comply Deterrence Overt act is up to the opponent Example: If you take action X, I will beat you over the head with a club Setting the stage, waiting for the opponent to do something Measures of Success War can have both types of threats: Compellence Measured by how closely the compellent act conforms to one’s wishes Deterrence Measures by not having to follow through on the threat Inaction Success harder to prove for deterrence, but very easy to t...
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