Unformatted text preview: heerest coincidence,and entirely unknown to Smith, the place
mentionedin proposition(h) happensreallyto be the placewhereBrown
is. If these two conditions hold then Smith does not know that (h) is
true, even though (i) (h) is true, (ii) Smith does believe that (h) is true,
and (iii) Smith is justifiedin believing that (h) is true.
These two examplesshow that definition(a) does not state a sufficient
condition for someone's knowing a given proposition. The same cases,
with appropriatechanges, will suffice to show that neither definition
(b) nor definition(c) do so either.
Wayne tate University CIRCULARITYAND INDUCTION
By PETER ACHINSTEIN 1. DECENTLY1 I suggested why an argument proposed by Max
\ Black, which attempts to support an inductive rule by citing
its past success, suffers from circularity. The inductive rule under
discussion is this:
R: To argue from Mostinstancesf As examined nder widevariety f
conditionsave een to (probably)ThenextA to beencountered be
The argumentin favour of the rule is as follows:
(a): In most instancesof the use of R in argumentswith truepremisses
examinedin a wide variety of conditions, R has been successful.
In the next instanceto be encounteredof use of R in an argument
with a true premiss,R will be successful.
" The Circularityof a Self-Supporting Inductive Argument ", ANALYSIS, (June 1962)....
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