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that Smith does not knowthat (e) is true; for (e) is true in virtue of the
number of coins in Smith's pocket, while Smith does not know how
many coins are in Smith'spocket, and bases his belief in (e) on a count
of the coins in Jones's pocket, whom he falsely believes to be the man
who will get the job.
Let us suppose that Smith has strong evidence for the following
(f) Jones owns a Ford.
Smith'sevidence might be that Jones has at all times in the past within
Smith's memory owned a car, and always a Ford, and that Jones has
just offered Smith a ride while driving a Ford. Let us imagine, now,
that Smith has another friend, Brown, of whose whereabouts he is
totally ignorant. Smith selects three place-namesquite at random, and
constructsthe following three propositions:
(g) Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Boston; CIRCULARITY AND INDUCTION 123 (h) Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Barcelona;
(i) Either Jones owns a Ford, or Brown is in Brest-Litovsk.
Each of these propositionsis entailedby (f). Imaginethat Smithrealizes
the entailmentof each of these propositions he has constructedby (f),
and proceeds to accept (g), (h), and (i) on the basis of (f). Smith has
correctlyinferred(g), (h), and (i) from a proposition for which he has
strong evidence. Smith is therefore completely justified in believing
each of these three propositions. Smith, of course, has no idea where
But imagine now that two further conditions hold. First, Jones
does notown a Ford, but is at presentdrivinga rentedcar.And secondly,
by the s...
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This document was uploaded on 03/04/2014 for the course PHIL 412 at Cal Poly.
- Winter '10