Unformatted text preview: two points in mind, I shall now present two cases
1 Plato seems to be considering some such definition at Theaetetus201, and perhaps
accepting one at Meno98.
2 Roderick M.
Chisholm, Perceiving: Philosophical tudy,Cornell University Press (Ithaca,
New York, 1957), p. 16.
3 A. J. Ayer, The Problem f Knowledge, acmillan (London, 1956),
121 122 ANALYSIS in which the conditions stated in (a) are true for some proposition,
though it is at the same time false that the person in question knows
Suppose that Smith and Jones have appliedfor a certainjob. And
suppose that Smith has strong evidence for the following conjunctive
(d) Jones is the man who will get the job, and Jones has ten coins in
Smith's evidence for (d) might be that the president of the company
assured him that Jones would in the end be selected, and that he,
Smith, had counted the coins in Jones's pocket ten minutes ago.
(e) The man who will get the job has ten coins in his pocket.
Let us supposethat Smithsees the entailmentfrom(d) to (e), and accepts
(e) on the grounds of (d), for which he has strong evidence. In this
case, Smith is clearlyjustifiedin believing that (e) is true.
But imagine,further,that unknown to Smith,he himself, not Jones,
will get the job. And, also, unknown to Smith, he himself has ten coins
in his pocket. Proposition (e) is then true, though proposition (d),
from which Smith inferred(e), is false. In our example,then, all of the
following are true: (i) (e) is true, (ii) Smith believes that (e) is true, and
(iii) Smith is justifiedin believing that (e) is true. But it is equall...
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