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Motivation empirical model experimental design

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Unformatted text preview: li (h ;q i ) le i =1 j 1 0 EU ji (h ;q i ) X e A (1 oi ) ln @1 j P EU i (h ;q ) el i l j Kendall, Nannicini & Trebbi (2014): “How Do Voters Respond to Information?” Motivation Empirical model Experimental design Reduced-form results Model estimation Conclusion Voters’subjective updating We assume: Truthful campaign information (factual ads) Rational updating (only for exposition, Bayesian) Voter-i belief updating about candidate A implies: A fV i;;P (v ; p jH = h) = Pri ;A (H = hjV = v ; P = p ) Pri ;A (H = h) A fV i;;P (v ; p ) h = 1; 2; 3 Kendall, Nannicini & Trebbi (2014): “How Do Voters Respond to Information?” Motivation Empirical model Experimental design Reduced-form results Model estimation Conclusion Voters’subjective updating (contd.) We elicit priors & posteriors from survey (no distributional assumptions) We don’ impose any restriction on the signaling game played between A, t B , and voters; and we then assess subjective updating from data Assumption Under SUTVA, voter-i posterior distribution on candidate j is: j fV i;;P (v ; p jH = h; W ) = Pri ;j (H = hjV = v ; P = p ) Pri ;j (H = h) Prj (W jV = v ; P = p ) Prj (W ) j fV i;;P (v ; p...
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This document was uploaded on 02/26/2014 for the course ECON 544 at UBC.

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