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Heterogeneity in ( ; ; ) as q 2 f1; 2g j f3g j f4; 5g
V ;2 = V ;3 ; P ;2 = P ;3 ) Speci…cation results: Similar weights for valence and ideology (except R voters)
Estimated well below 1 (i.e. concave ideological loss function) Positive association between left and valence perceptions for A
Positive association between right and valence perceptions for B
More extreme positions associated with higher valence (Bernhardt et
Kendall, Nannicini & Trebbi (2014): “How Do Voters Respond to Information?” Motivation Empirical model Experimental design Reduced-form results Model estimation Conclusion Examples of posterior of treated vs. control voter Kendall, Nannicini & Trebbi (2014): “How Do Voters Respond to Information?” Motivation Empirical model Experimental design Reduced-form results Model estimation Conclusion Construction of counterfactual electoral campaigns
Assume we want to know what if everybody in the city got treatment
H = h (e.g., what if everybody got the valence message)
Simulated campaign follows these steps:
1 Take estimates of the structural parameters of the posterior beliefs
= V ;3 ; V ;2 ; P ;3 ; P ;2 ; V ; P ; A ; B & assume they are
constant in the week before election 2 For each voter i generate prior belief distributions based on prior...
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This document was uploaded on 02/26/2014 for the course ECON 544 at UBC.
- Winter '14