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Unformatted text preview: whether or not they lie on the Pareto frontier
D. none of the above 12 7. Suppose a social choice rule yields the following rankings over three candidate
resource allocations P, Q and R:
(1) P > Q
(2) R > Q > P
“The social choice rule violates the independence of irrelevant alternatives axiom”.
8. In the context of social choice rules, “unrestricted domain” means
A. no dictatorship.
B. all individual preferences are admissible.
C. if every individual prefers a particular allocation to another, then so must the resulting
social preference ordering.
D. the social choice rule should provide the same ranking over a subset of options as it
would for the complete set of options.
9. A social choice rule for ranking alternative allocations is agenda-dependent
A. if it is ideologically based.
B. if the outcome depends on the order in which the alternatives are considered.
C. if it is designed to support a particular special interest.
D. None of the above.
10. The ultimate source of the impossibility in Arrow’s imposs...
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- Spring '14