Thus european settlements better institutions but

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Unformatted text preview: place constraints on elites when there are signi…cant settlements. Thus: European settlements ) better institutions But Europeans settlements are endogenous. They may be more likely to settle if a society has greater resources or more potential for growth. Or less settlements when greater resources; East India Company and Spanish crown limited settlements. James A. Robinson (Harvard) The Emergence of Modern Economic Growth: A Comparative and9, 2009 September Historical Analysis 17 / 24 Exogenous Source of Variation Look for exogenous variation in European settlements: the disease environment In some colonies, Europeans faced very high death rates because of diseases for which they had no immunity, in particular malaria and yellow fever. Potential mortality of European settlers ) settlements ) institutions Moreover, for many reasons, already discussed above, institutions persist; so Potential mortality of European settlers ) settlements ) past institutions ) current institutions James A. Robinson (Harvard) The Emergence of Modern Economic Growth: A Comparative and9, 2009 September Historical Analysis 18 / 24 Empirics: Colonial Origins of Comparative Development #1 Empirical setup: Two Stage Least-Squares (2SLS) Second stage: log income per capita = f(current economic institutions) First stage: current economic institutions = g(settler mortality) Data on potential European settler mortality. Work by the historian Philip Curtin provides us with mortality rates of soldiers stationed in the colonies in the early 19th century. Supplemented by data on mortality of Catholic bishops in Latin America Current economic institutions proxied by protection against expropriation risk Useful to bear in mind that history generates variation in a cluster of broad institutions; Protection against expropriation risk proxying for many other sources of institutional variation James A. Robinson (Harvard) The Emergence of Modern Economic Growth: A Comparative and9, 2009 September Historical Analysis 19 / 24 Empirics: Colonial Origins of...
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This document was uploaded on 02/28/2014 for the course ECON 2328 at Harvard.

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