And notice that the appeal to objective worth makes

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Unformatted text preview: ’s time, where the test of worth is at least partly independent of the subject’s ungrounded preferences or enjoyment. (233) Notice, then, that with her view, Wolf is taking us beyond the immanentist accounts of Camus, Taylor, and Feinberg. At the end of the day, they all suggested that a meaning of life can be derived simply from activities that have subjective worth- - activities toward which we have the right sort of positive, subjective attitudes. Thus, with Camus and Taylor, all that's required for meaning is that we find ways to appreciate (or want to do) the activities in our lives; with Feinberg, all that's required is that we do activities that flow from and develop our distinctly human dispositions, but these activities, of course, are bound to be activities that give us a subjective sense of fulfillment. And notice that the appeal to objective worth makes sense of why Wolf's view is called a "fitting fulfillment" view: the objective worth of meaningful activities means that the subjective worth they have- - the fulfillment we get from them- - is "fitting." Recall the distinction between an objective meaning of life and a subjective meaning of life, which we encountered in our look at Taylor. We can put the matter this way: whereas Camus, Taylor, and Feinberg all attempt to ground the meaning of life merely in subjective meaning, Wolf is suggesting that the meaning of life involves both subjective meaning (this is what the notion of active engagement gives us) and objective me...
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