Compare tolstoys worries leading up to his arrest of

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Unformatted text preview: aning (this is what the notion of projects of worth gives us). As Wolf acknowledges, it’s the objective worth aspect of her view that is likely to be the controversial one. And, indeed, the immanentists we've looked at so far shy away from it. So why include an appeal to objective worth, to “projects of worth,” in an account of the 3 meaning of life? Why not just stick with subjective worth or subjective meaning as the sole basis, from an immanentist point of view, of the meaning of life? Wolf provides two reasons for why we need objective worth in our view of the meaning of life: 1. An appeal to objective worth allows us to make sense of why individuals sometimes __________________________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________________________________________. That is, if the meaning of life were just about subjective worth—derived simply from one’s feeling fulfilled in, one's being passionate about, one's activities—then it wouldn’t be reasonable for individuals to worry whether their subjectively worthwhile lives have a meaning. (This would be like worrying about whether something that tastes sweet to you really tastes sweet to you.) But it can be reasonable for individuals to worry about this. (Compare Tolstoy's worries, leading up to his "arrest of life.") As Wolf says: Consider […] the longings or concerns about meaning that people have, their wondering whether their lives are meaningful, their vows...
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This document was uploaded on 03/12/2014 for the course PHIL 1000 at UWO.

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