if work cant ground the meaning of life however

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Unformatted text preview: ecause every work- activity as such is always a mere means, and receives its values only from its goals. (64) (Here, compare Nagel’s discussion of what we called the Instrumental Worth Argument, and Feinberg’s response to the “supermarket regress”: the central lesson to be learned from these is that activities of mere instrumental worth could never alone serve as ground for the meaning of life, because they would always require activities of intrinsic worth to give them meaning.) If work can’t ground the meaning of life, however, perhaps its opposite—play—can, where play = ________________________________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________________________________________. 2 After all, if anything can count as having intrinsic worth, and not merely instrumental worth- - and hence ground the meaning of life- - it seems, according to Schlick, that play in this sense would: […] life means movement and action, and if we wish to find a meaning in it we must seek for activities which carry their own purpose and value within them, independently of any extraneous goals; activities, therefore, which are not work, in the philosophical sense of the word. […] There really are such activities. To be consistent, we must call them play, since that is the name for free, purposeless action, that is, action which in fact carries its purpose within itself. (64) On a first- pass formulation, then, Schlick’s proposal about the meaning of life might be put as follows:...
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This document was uploaded on 03/12/2014 for the course PHIL 1000 at UWO.

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