For he is supposed to be the creator not of the world

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Unformatted text preview: quot;best of all possible worlds"), and that our failure to understand this is due to the fact that we can't see the grand scope of things, how all the apparent evils of the world fit into the overall plan of God, and so on. If that's the case, then the apparent widespread evil in the world doesn't in Leibniz's view contradict the existence of a personal, all good, all knowing, all powerful transcendent being like God, because in creating this world with all of its apparent evils, that being did the best that could possibly be done. Schopenhauer doesn't buy this. He thinks that, despite the claims of people like Leibniz, the problem of evil really can't be solved and hence we have conclusive reason to think that there is no transcendent being of the sort supposed. As Schopenhauer puts it: Even though Leibnitz’ contention, that this is the best of all possible worlds, were correct, that would not justify God in having created it. For he is [supposed to be] the Creator not of the world only, but of possibility itself; and, therefore, he ought to have so ordered possibility as that it would admit of something better. There are two things which make it impossible to believe that this world is the successful work of an all- wise, all- good, and, at the same time, all- powerful Being: firstly, the misery which abounds in it everywhere; and, secondly, the obvious imperfection of its highest product, man, who is a burlesque of what he should be. (51) (The "two things" that Schopenhauer mentions here are just the two main sorts of evil we find in the world: ______...
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This document was uploaded on 03/12/2014 for the course PHIL 1000 at UWO.

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