Lecture_schemata_3

144 in other words nagel is claiming in effect that

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Unformatted text preview: r they will die too.) (144) (Note that Nagel's use of the term "justification" (and a bit later, "purpose") in this part of his essay is meant to be equivalent talk of "meaning.") To capture the reasoning of this argument succinctly, let's first introduce a distinction: 3 Instrumental worth: _______________________________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________________________________________________________ _________________________________________________________________________________________________________ Intrinsic worth: ____________________________________________________________________________________ ________________________________________________________________________________________________________. Given this distinction, we can now represent the reasoning of this third argument as follows: P1 If there is an immanent meaning of life, then life must relate to something immanent that has intrinsic worth. P2 Life can't relate to something immanent that has intrinsic worth (because nothing immanent has intrinsic worth; immanent things can only ever have instrumental worth). C Therefore, there is no immanent meaning to life. Nagel’s reply: …life does not consist of a sequence of activities each of which has...
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This document was uploaded on 03/12/2014 for the course PHIL 1000 at UWO.

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