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Unformatted text preview: attempt on improving the first outcome would make the row player strictly worse
off. Any attempt to change from the second outcome would hurt the column player.
ii) No, because none of the strategies is strictly dominated.
iii) No pure strategy NE. Game c
Bring a Cake
Bring Chicken Make Tiramisu
1,1
3,2 Make Steak
2,1
0,0 i) There is a unique Pareto efficient outcome: (Chicken, Tiramisu).
ii) No. None of the strategies is strictly dominated.
iii) Two pure strategy NE’s: (Chicken, Tiramisu) and (Cake, Steak) Game d
Wear Blue
Wear Red Wear White
0,0
0,0 Wear Black
0,0
0,0 i) Every one of the four outcomes is Pareto efficient.
ii) No. None of the strategies is strictly dominated.
iii) Four pure strategy NE’s: (Blue, White), (Blue, Black), (Red, White), (Red, Black) 4. Consider the following game: Top
Bottom Left
0,0
1,2 Right
3,1
x,y a) For what values of x and y is the game dominance solvable?
For deletion starting with Top:
For deletion starting with Right:
b) For what values of x and y is (Top, Left) a Nash equilibrium?
No values...
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This homework help was uploaded on 03/17/2014 for the course ECON 302 taught by Professor Shihenlu during the Fall '13 term at Simon Fraser.
 Fall '13
 ShihEnLu
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