Reading Notes on Denuclearization and Human Rights in North Korea

The united states should recognize that the current

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Unformatted text preview: with NK. Among other things, plans to delink humanitarian assistance from other diplomatic developments. Their plan is to offer NK a small amount of food aid. US FOOD ASSISTANCE o The amount of food aid has varied form year to year, but in general, PY has successfully ensured a significant inflow. China, SK, US, and Japan are the main food aid contributors and NK has bee adept at turning from one donor to another, opportunistically seeking out the least stringent terms. o US generally gives food assistance through the UN World Food Programme (WFP) o Beijing and Seoul have made few request Chanlett- Avery, Emma and Ian Rinehart. “North Korea: US Relations, Nuclear Diplomacy, and Internal Situation,” Congressional Research Service. 15 January 2014. <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/R41259.pdf>. • US interests in NK encompass crucial security, political, and human rights concerns. o Bilateral military alliances with the ROK and Japan obligate the US to defend these allies from any attack from the North. o An outbreak of conflict on the Korean peninsula or the collapse of the government in PY would have severe implications for the regional economy. o Diplomacy surrounding NK’s nuclear weapons program influence US relations with all the major powers in the region and have become particularly complicating factors for US- China ties. • If the PY regime falls due to internal or external forces, the potential for major massive humanitarian crisis, not to mention long- term economic and social repercussions, loom large. • Overview of Past US NK Policy o Identifying patterns in North Korean behavior is challenging, as Pyongyang often weaves together different approaches to the outside world. North Korean behavior has vacillated between limited cooperation and overt provocations, including testing several ballistic missiles over the last 15 years and three nuclear devices in 2006, 2009, and 2013. Pyongyang’s willingness to negotiate has often appeared to be driven by its internal conditions: food shortages or economic desperation can push North Korea to re- engage in talks, usually to extract more aid from China or, in the past, from South Korea. North Korea has proven skillful at exploiting divisions among the other five parties and taking advantage of political transitions in Washington to stall the nuclear negotiating process. o As North Korea continues to reject diplomatic solutions to denuclearizing the peninsula, analysts have begun to coalesce around the consensus that Pyongyang is committed to maintaining a minimum number of nuclear weapons as a security guarantor. o Even as North Korea carried out a series of provocative acts, the Obama Administration has maintained a policy toward North Korea known as “strategic patience,” which essentially waits for North Korea to come back to the negotiating table while maintaining pressure on the regime. The main elements of the policy involve insisting that Pyongyang commit to steps toward denuclea...
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This document was uploaded on 03/15/2014 for the course EASTASN 189K at Stanford.

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