Reading Notes on Denuclearization and Human Rights in North Korea

O they want the house of kim forever the north seeks

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Unformatted text preview: ate negotiating chips. PY’s devotion to massive amounts of very scarce resources to such projects suggests it actually wants to acquire these capabilities and be accepted by the world as a nuclear weapons state. The NK leadership may want nuclear weapons, but is that all they want? After all, you can’t eat plutonium. This logic leads many to argue that PY seeks nukes only for lack of a better deal out there offering NK food, energy, and a new relationship with the international community. The problem with this logic is that the Kim family has been offered such a deal, twice. The 1994 Agreed Framework negotiated by the Clinton administration initially froze NK’s plutonium production facilities at Yongbyon in return for US- supplied heavy fuel oil, but the agreement also laid out the vision of a peace regime, normalized relations with the US, and economic and energy assistance for denuclearization. The 2006 6PT Joint Statement offered all of these benefits and more in return for the same denuclearization. US adminsitrations have state their disinterest in buying the same horse again. o They want an India deal. When told that it was not likely for the US to accept NK as it did India and Pakistan, they argued that this was tantamount to stripping them naked without any corresponding actions. Instead, they argued that this should ne about mutual nuclear arms reductions between two established nuclear powers. o They want the house of Kim forever The North seeks a deeper, more fundamental form of protection for the Kim family and its cronies. They know they have to open up to be successful but that would expose them and threaten their control. Challenges for the US o Keeping the Chinese honest in terms of comploying with sanctions even after North Koreans show interest in returning to the table for negotiations. • Lankov, Andrei. “Why the United States will have to accept a nuclear North Korea,” The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis, Vol. 21 (3), September 2009. Pp. 251- 264. • First of all, NK needs nukes as a powerful strategic deterrent. Kim Il Sung was very impressed by the efficacy of the US nukes in 1945, and the NK leadership believes that no foreign invader would attack them white they have a nuke deterrent. They are deeply afraid of a foreign attack. • Second, the nuke program has domestic importance as well. The nuke te...
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This document was uploaded on 03/15/2014 for the course EASTASN 189K at Stanford.

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