Murray Millet Chapter 2 Assault from the Sea

And ground counterattack debate in the us was open to

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Unformatted text preview: ed better • • • abilitry to move tropps to and equipement rapidy from transports to landing craft- Probs with army takeover of ops- spent too much time leanrng to land and not enough learning to giths- , also only practiced at undefended sights so used to landing fast and no dependence on naval gunfire- and no close air support was required- shinese ops taught them to land at night, with widely dispersed yet concentrated at the point f attack- Navy wanted to focus more on technical training- whichc spirred innovation of emph forces- but still couldn’t compete with strength of army forces- to seize phiilip hong kong wtc- they till attacked at night- developed landing forces by parachute- By 1941- army and navy had a huge breadth of theorreitcal expertise and operational wisdom- althoughintersevee rivalry in strategic planning complicated collaboration of the army and navy, it did not tprovent them from having succeffsul landings The Us • In interwar- brought level of amph ops to a superior level than bj- had annual fleet landing exercises and accepted the naval services puclished doctrinal guidance-...
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This document was uploaded on 03/20/2014 for the course STIA 396 at Georgetown.

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