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Computational Mechanism Design Optimal Auction Design

Submitted for publication 16 parkes d c and ungar l

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Unformatted text preview: and Ronen, A. 1999. Algorithmic mechanism design extended abstract. In Proc. 31st Annual Symposium on Theory of Computing STOC99. 15. Parkes, D. C., and Ungar, L. H. 2000a. Bounded rational compatible auctions. Submitted for publication. 16. Parkes, D. C., and Ungar, L. H. 2000b. Iterative combinatorial auctions: Theory and practice. In Proc. 17th National Conference on Arti cial Intelligence AAAI-00, 74 81. 17. Parkes, D. C.; Ungar, L. H.; and Foster, D. P. 1999. Accounting for cognitive costs in on-line auction design. In Noriega, P., and Sierra, C., eds., Agent Mediated Electronic Commerce LNAI 1571. Springer-Verlag. 25 40. Earlier version appeared at the Agents'98 Workshop on Agent Mediated Electronic Trading, 1998. 18. Parkes, D. C. 1999a. iBundle: An e cient ascending price bundle auction. In Proc. ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce EC-99, 148 157. 19. Parkes, D. C. 1999b. On agent metadeliberation strategies in auctions. Technical report, University of Pennsylvania. 20. Parunak, V.; Ward, A.; and Sauter, J. 1998. A systematic market approach to distributed constraint problems. Poster session, Proc. 3rd International Conference on Multi-Agent Systems ICMAS-98, 455 456. 21. Rothhopf, M. H., and Harstad, R. M. 1994. Modeling competitive bidding: A critical essay. Management Science 403:364 384. 22. Russell, S., and Wefald, E. 1991. Principles of metareasoning. Arti cial Intelligence 49:361 395. 23. Sandholm, T. W., and Lesser, V. R. 1996. Advantages of a leveled commitment contracting protocol. In Proc. 14th National Conference on Arti cial Intelligence AAAI-96, 126 133. 24. Sandholm, T. W., and Lesser, V. R. 1997. Coalitions among computationally bounded agents. Arti cial Intelligence 941 2:99 137. 25. Sandholm, T. 1993. An implementation of the Contract Net Protocol based on marginal-cost calculations. In Proc. 11th National Conference on Arti cial Intelligence AAAI-93, 256 262. 26. Shoham, Y., and Tennenholtz, M. 1999. What can a market compute, and at what expense? Technical report, Technion. 27. Varian, H., and MacKie-Mason, J. K. 1995. Generalized Vickrey auctions. Technical report, University of Michigan. 28. Varian, H. R. 1995. Economic mechanism design for computerized agents. In Proc. USENIX Workshop on Electronic Commerce. Minor update, 2000. 29. Wellman, M. P. 1993. A market-oriented programming environment and its application to distributed multicommodity ow problems. Journal of Arti cial Intelligence Research 1:1 23. 14...
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