Productivity gains if small farms more productive and

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Unformatted text preview: m variant 2: landlord estates Targeted to tenant farmers: Tenants who cultivate land are given property rights Skills and implements necessary to cultivate the land aer already held Examples: Bolivia, eastern india, Ethiopia, iran, japan, korea Problems: Anticipation: landlords pre- emptively evict tenant farmers Post- reform hold ups: landlords may control watersheds or other critical resources Land reform continued: Is there an argument for it? Productivity gains (if small farms more productive, and if owned land is better than tenanted land) Distributional consequences Poverty Inequality Long- term institutional and political effects Land tenure and institutions: Percentage of usable cultivatable land held as family farms vs. some measure of democracy. The more family lands you have, the fewer lands you would have for large rich households taking control of the lands. Relationship between concentration of economic distribution of land and concentration of democracy The case against? Ineffective? Create more real estate land markets? If landlords have better representation/influence, they may “capture” the reform process, receive a stream of income. Loopholes in land reform laws are common (e.g.) landowner can gift land to extended family or servants and keep “effective” control) In some cases. May worsen situation for landless Inefficient? Potential loss of...
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This document was uploaded on 03/28/2014 for the course INAF 252 at Georgetown.

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