Sepulveda_CrimProI_Answer_SP11

Sepulveda_CrimProI_Answer_SP11 - Exam No Final...

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Unformatted text preview: Exam No. Final Examination—Grade Summary Part l—Multiple Choice 4'1 /50 Part Z—Essay fl 8. 5/50 Total Points: 3;. 9100 = A ID: CrimPro1_LSN_Sepu1veda_Fina1_20llSL Sepulveda ID: (Exam Number) Exam Name: CrimPro1_LSN_Sepulveda_Final_2011SL Instructor: Sepulveda Grade: Page 1 of1 Exam taken with Sofl' est v10.0 ID: CrimPro1_LSN_Sepulveda_Fina1_2 0 IISL Sepulveda 1) Essay Driver's D Motion to Su ress MTS Statements to Police on 5th and 6th Amendment Grounds Statements Made at Scene of Traffic Stop a 0'5 MTS on 5th Am. grounds the statements D made at the scene of the traffic stop to Officer Doolittle (OD) should be granted by the trial court because her 5th amendment right to avoid self-incrimination was violated. A threshold issue is whether her statement at the traffic stop was ian. Brown/Ashcroft/Spano. The voluntari ass of a statement/confession is measured by the totality of the circumstances (1‘05 specifically whether or not the suspect‘s tatement is product of her own free will or if her will was overcome by the intetwé: Brown/Ashcroft/Spano. A statement that is the product of duress or coercion. express or implied. is inadmissible. Some factors to be considered are whether or not D was read her Miranda rights (see below) and whether she waived them, whether there was a threat of violence or violence or a prolonged interrogation. Here there was no Miranda warning given before D made her statement to 0D. However, that is not dispositive of coercion. There was no violence or threat of violence. Therefore. considering the TOC, there was no indication that her statement was the product of any duress or coercion. as her response that there might be "something of interest" to 00's question regarding additional weapons in her car _____—____________________.____——-——-——————-— Page 1 of 12 (Question 1 continued) CrimPro1_LSN_Sepulveda_Final_2OIISL involuntary, and were instead products of her own free will; therefore, they are admissible on this ground. Sepulveda Under Miranda, a prosecutor may not use in her case-in-chief the statements made by H a D, stemming from a custodial interrogation, unless procedural safeguards are used t ensure D's 5th Am. right to avoid making self-incriminating statements. Miranda. Miranda only applies to custodial interrogations, not temporal‘fietentions. "Custody" under Miranda is defined as either a formal arrest or what a reasonable suspect would understand as a restriction on his freedom of movement that rises tWree of a formal arrest. Bertram-lam. D had not yet been formally arrested; however, a reasonable suspect could have understood being placed in OD's cop car in handcuffs as a restraint that rises to the degree of a formal arrest. However, "interrogation" under Miranda also has to be present, whi h Imnes as either ewgsquestioning or its functional equivalent (wordtlatgnsthat a reasonable officer should know are likely to elicit an incriminating response from a suspect). Innis. Here. DO asked D whether or not there were additional weapons in her car. which is expwgquestioning. and is therefore interrogation under Innis. Even though DO may not have meant to elicit the incriminating response provided by D about the drugs. his subjective belief in the questions he was asking are irrelevant. Whren. DO did not read D her Miranda rights (the right to remain silent. that your statements will be used against you, that you have the right to an attorney, and that if you cannot afford one. an attorney will be appointed for you). Miranda. Therefore, since this is a custodial interrogation under Berkemer ' _____________________________________——————-————————— Page 2 of 12 (Question 1 continued) ID : CrimPro1_LSN_Sepu1veda_Final_2 0 1 ISL Sepulveda and Innis. and DO did not read D her Miranda rights as required. D's motion to suppress these statements on 5th Am. grounds should be granted. However. they can still be used by the prosecutor to impeach D's testimony «trial. Harris. Moreover. if the prosecution can prove that the cocaine would have been inevitably been discovered by means independent from D's statements. the statement could be admitted under the Inevitable Discovery Doctrine (Nix) 49‘ 0‘5 MTS on 6th Am. grounds regarding statements made to OD at the scene of the traffic stop should be denied by the trial court. The 6th Am. provides a right to counsel (RTC) for defendants in felony cases, and misdemeanor cases that involve imprisonment (Gideon - making this applicable to states). This RTC attaches when formal judicial proceedings are initiated/(fiver), specifically when the following occur: 1) the D is initially brought before a magistrate/:5)— the D is informed of nature of the charges against him; and 3) the D's libertyi_s,subj‘éct tVis applies whether or not any formal complaint has been filed against D. R ery. Here, D's RTC under the 6th Amendment has not attached because she was only temporarily detained at the time she made the statements regarding the "something of interest" in the glove box to DD. Although her liberty was probably subject to restraint under Rothgery, since she was handcuffed and in the back of the police car. she hadn't yet been brought before a judge and had not been informed of the charges against her (she hadn't been charged yet). Therefore. since her 6th Am. RTC hadn't attached yet, there is no violation, and the court should dismiss the portion of her motion based on 6th Am. grounds. __________________________.___.___———————————— Page 3 of 12 (Question 1continued) ID : CrimPro1_LSN_Sepu1veda_Fina1_2 O llsL Sepulveda ’) Statements Made in Interview with First Detective (FD) ' lW D's MTS on 5th Am. grounds the statements she made in her interview with FD should be denied by the trial court because her 5th Am. rights were not violated. As stated, Miranda requires that procedural safeguards are used to protect D's 5th Am. right K against self-incrimination when D is in custody and being interrogated. Here D wa A13} formally arrested, so she was in "custody". Berkemer. FD had not yet begun to question D, so there was no express questioning under Innis; however, there could b its functional equivalent, as bringing D into an interview room at a police station cou be viewed by a reasonable officer as an action that is reasonably likely to elicit incriminating statements under Innis. But before FD asked her any questions. he advised D of her Miranda rights as required. There is no indication that his Miranda advisement was deficient. Powell. She then stated she wanted an attorney. An invocation of the Miranda right to counsel (MRTC) requires a clear Wbiguous statement that a suspect wants her attorney. Davis/He/re/D stated explicitly that she wanted an attorney. so it was clear and unambiguous. An officer is then reqw terminate all questioning once there is a proper invocation of the MRTC. Edwards. FD did this. and did not ask any more questions of D. Therefore, since FD followed all procedures required under Miranda and Edwards. there has been no violation of D’s 5th Am. rights and her motion on this ground should be denied. Similarly, her MTS on 6th Am. grounds the statements D made in her interview with FD should also be denied by the trial court. D's RTC under the 6th Am. had not yet _______________________.._.__————————— Page 4 of 12 (Question 1 continued) ID: CrimProl_LSN_Sepulveda_Fina1_2 0 llsL Sepulveda attached, ause formal judicial proceedings had not been initiated under Brewer, and she had not been brought before a magistrate or informed of the charges against her. Rothgery. She was arrested. so her liberty was subject to restraint under Rothgery. but since the other factors weren't true. her 6th Am. RTC had not attached at this point, and her motion should be denied. Statements Made in Interview with Second Detective (SD) (L ( Again, the voluntariness of D's statements to SD have to be consi ered under a TOC analysis. Brown/Ashcroft/Spano. A factor to be considered in assessing whether this was a voluntary statement is whether or not D waived her Miranda right to remain silent. Here D waived her right to remain silent and then made statements to SD. Other factors to be considered are whether or not there was a threat of violence or violence or a prolonged interrogation. There was no prolonged interrogation or violence as far as we know. and we do know that she waived her Miranda rights. Even though this is not dispositive. considering all of these factors, it is likely that her statements were voluntary. D's motion to suppress the statements she made to SD on 5th Am. grounds should be denied because her 5th Am. rights were not violated. First. although it is not clear where D was interviewed byB:D,/we4€now she was released on bail. so it is likely she was not in "custody" under emer, as she was not formally arrested and a reasonable suspect would not believe that being out on bail was akin to a restraint on Page 5 of 12 (Question 1 continued) ID: CrimPro1_LSN_Sepulveda_Final_2 0 llSL Sepulveda liberty such as a formal arrest. Innis. It is also not clear whether there was an interrogation, as there were not express questions asked and again. it is unclear if the functional equivalent of express questions occurred. However. even if there was custodial interrogation, SD advised D of her Miranda rights, and there is no indication that his Miranda advisement was deficient. Powell. Moreover, she explicitly waived both rights, meaning she waived her right to counsel and right to remain silent. As long as her waiver was "knowing and intelligent," it is valid. Zerbst. Therefore. there was no is granted, her statements can still be used to impeach her. Harris. ,7 2) M. WSW W: W%7UU’S' ‘ A 5 ' 0pm Finally, D's MTS regarding the statements she made to SD on 6th Am. grounds should be denied. Here D invoked her right to counsel at LimendeuLwithED s stated, at gen be voided by a break in custody of 14 days or more. T there was only a break between her Miranda invocation of RTC and her Miranda waiver of only one week, so Thompkins is inapplicable. However, she waived her right to counsel and to remain silent at the interview with SD. If this was a valid waiver under attached under Brewer and Rothgery when she was subsequently arraigned and appointed counsel. She did not invoke her 6th Am. RTC at this time. W subsequent Miranda waiver was sufficient to waive her 6th Am. RTC, r TS should be dismissed on this ground. Supposing she nag invoked her 6th Am. RTC at Zerbst (above), then the SD was free to question her. After that, her 6th Am. 5, this time. under Jackson, her subsequent Miranda waiver would not have been Page 6 of 12 {Question 1 continued) ID: CrimPro1_LSN_.Sepulveda_Fina1_2 0 llsL Sepulveda sufficient to waive her 6th Am. RTC. However. since Montejo overruled Jackson. her Miranda waiver was sufficient to waive her 6th Am. RTC. Montejo. Therefore. her MTS on 6th Am. grounds should be denied. D‘s MTS Evidence Obtained from Her Personl Car and Apartment on 4th Amendment Grounds Drugs Seized from D's Person at the Traffic Stop Iliad/49 WW WWW The 4th Amendment protects persons from unreasonable searches and seizures. A ,—-- search warrant is required to seize property, unless it falls under an exception. One exception is the pat search. An officer may perform a pat SW has reasonable suspicion (RS) that a suspect is presently armgLandda/ngerous. Ms measured by TOC. and must be based on articulable facts in light of the officer's experience, and cannot be just based on an "inchoate hunch." Terry/Sibron. During a pat search. the officer may remove any hard objW are potentially weapons) from the suspect’s person and may remove items he immediately detects are contraband, provided he does not extensively manipulate them. Here OD permissibly ordered D out of her car (discussed below) and probably had reasonable suspicion to perform a pat search of her. First, D was acting nervous, which can be used as a basis for RS (Wardlow). and she was also reaching into the glove box. A reasonable officer could think that she was reaching for a weapon and therefore that she was presently armed and dangerous under Sibron. Therefore, OD had RS to pat search her. He __________________________—___———————— Page 7 of 12 (Question 1conlinued) ID: CrimPro1_LSN_Sepu1veda_Final_2 0 llSL Sepulveda therefore was permitted to remove any hard objects or any items he could immediately tell were contraband. He felt a hard object during the pat search. and removed the knife and contraband (small amount of marijuana) without any apparent extensive manipulation. Therefore, he was permitted to remove these items, and D's MTS the drugs removed from her during the pat search should be denied. Drugs Seized from D's Car at the Traffic Stop A temporary detention is different from a consensual encounter, which is when a reasonable person would feel free to go about her business. A traffic stop is a 011, temporary detention, and an officer may stop a car based only on reasonable suspicion. / Terry/Sibcanforder to lawfully st0p D-s car, OD would need reWpicion that criminal activity was afoot, and that D was connected with this criminal activity. Terry. A traffic offense is sufficient to give the requisite RS, but since OD did not notice if? anything unusual about how D was driving, there appears to be no traffic offense here. OD's RS could also be based on anonymous tip er); however, an uncorroborated anonymous tip cannot suffice as RS. Flmere there was an anonymous tip that gave a great amount of detail regarding D's appearance and her car's appearance. Even though D and her car matched this description, without more. there was not enough RS for OD to stop D's car. However. even though D did not have R8 to stop D's vehicle, he did have PC to search her car, which he can do without a search warrant (once PC is established). ____________________—_——————-————— Page 8 of 12 (Question 1 continued) CrimPro1_LSN_Sepulveda_Final_2 0 llsL Sepulveda o 3 2 arney. Once OD approached D's car, he smelled a strong odor of alcohol and saw physical signs that D was drunk. This likely gave OD probable cause (PC) to then search her vehicle. PC to search is a TOC test determined by whether there is fair probability that evidence of a crime or contraband are presently to be found in a particular location. based on articulable facts. Gates. Here because of the fact that there were physical signs of her driving under the influence (a crime), and she failed sobriety tests. and D told him there was something of interest in the car, OD probably had the PC necessary to search her car. The PC required to search a car must be that particular items are to be found in a particular car. Cambpell. Once this PC is established, as it has been here, it applies to the entire car, including the trunk. glove compartments, and passenger compartments. Carroll/Carney. So OD thus had the PC necessary to search the passenger compartment of the car. whether or not D was in her car. which he did. The drugs he found in the glove compartment are admissible on this ground alone. However, an officer can also p orm a search of a car incident to an arrest (except for the trunk). Atwater/Bel . tdoes not matter whether D or the officer initiates the contact. Thomto ere D was arrested. so Atwater/Belton applies. Under nt. an officer can search a car incident to arrest (except for the trunk) if: 1) hWy believes that the suspect has access to the car at the time of the arrest; 0 2) if the officer reasonably believes that evidence of the crime is comma Gant. Here D was handcuffed and placed in the back of his car by the time he did the search, so the first prong of Gant does not apply; however, he could reasonably believe that the evidence of the DUI could be found in the car. so he was permitted to search the glove Page 9 of 12 (Question 1 continued) ID: CrimProl_LSN_Sepulveda_Final_2 0 1 lSL Sepulveda compartmeind seize the cocaine. Therefore. the drugs would be admissible on thi i ground as well. Even if the initial stop was illegal, the prosecution couyrofie that the drugs in the glove compartment would have inevitably been found rough an inventory search of D's car after her arrest. Nix. Such a search is permiss’ as long as there are rtine. departmental standards followed in good faith. WAS.“ 5—wa 7' (£23) Therefore, D's MTS regarding the drugs found in her car should be denied. Evidence Seized from D's Apartment )5 OD did not have consent to search D's apartment or a search warrant (SW) to search her apartment, which is typically required. Also. there were no exigent circums es (Olson) present that would permit him to enter without an SW, such as 1) hot pursuit of a fleeing felon; 2) preventing D's escape; 3) potential danger to people on the scene; or 4) the imminent destruction of evidence. Olson. This is because D was already in m/ custody by the time he searched her apartment. and there was nothing suggesting / someone was destroying evidence at her apartment. Moreover. an officer can search place incident to an arrest. specifically the "wingspan" of the person being arreste (i.e. the area under the suspect's control or possession). Chimel. That is inapposi here because again. D was already at the station. Finally, an officer can do a "protective" sweep of an area, incidental to a lawful entry, specifically to check the area(s) _______________—_________________———-—————— Page 10 of 12 (Question 1 continued) ID: CrimPro1_LSN_Sepu1veda_Fina1_20 llsL Sepulveda immediately adjoining the place of arrest. Buie. Again. that is inapposite here, because . . 7 this was an Illegal ant? . 5 O L , However, even if this was an illegal entry (which it was). if the evidence later rec ered under a legal SW was based Wtion gathered independently from the illegal +3 g entry, then it is still admissible egura. Here. the search warrant was based not on OD's entry, but on the detectives' prior investigation of D and previous drug buys. Therefore, the evidence seized is likely admissible under Segura. and her MTS the evidence seized pursuant to the warrant from her apartment should be denied. ML rm?- Fruit of the Poisonous Tree Anal sis FOPT JJ D could argue that her subsequent statements to the police and the resulting evidence were "fruit of the poisonous tree". Wong Sun. The FOPT doctrine says that if there is a constitutional violation. the court should ask. assuming there is a primary illegality. is the proof offered at trial gathered by means sufficiently distinguishable so as to purge the taint of the primary illegality? Wong Sun. The court considers several factors. including: 1) the temporal proximity between the primary illegality and the later evidence gathered; 2) whether the suspect was Mirandized and waived; and 3) intervening circumstances. Brown/Dunaway. As stated, D's statements made at the scene of the traffic stop were taken in violation of Miranda and were uncoerced. Uncoerced statements taken in violation of Miranda do Page 11 of12 (Question 1 continued) ID : CrimPro1_LSN_Sepu1veda_Final_2 0 1 18L Sepulveda not render later statements inadmissible as FOPT. Oregon v. Elstad. Likewise, physical evidence that is a result of uncoerced statements violating Miranda is not barred from admissibility. Patane. Here, even though her initial sta ent to DO may have been a violation of her Miranda rights. under Elstaleata , any evidence (4 resulting from it is not barred. as her initial statement was at coerced. Therefore, the (9/ "derivative" evidence of her initial statement. such as the cocaine, marijuana, her later statements, and the items seized from her apartment. are not barred by this initial Miranda violation. There is no evidence here that DO was trying to do an "end run" around D's Miranda rights when he obtained her initial statement that there was "something of in...
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