Fischoff 27 1982 discusses debiasing techniques

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Unformatted text preview: off 27 (1982) discusses debiasing techniques intended to improve the quality of subjective performance assessments. Gigerenzer and Hoffrage (1995) emphasise that framing judgements in frequency terms (as opposed to the more traditional subjective “degree of belief”) can reduce assessment bias in a variety of situations. Other studies (Clemen, Jones and Winkler, 1996; Hora, Dodd and Hora, 1993) suggest that embracing the divide and conquer orientation of decision analysis in probability assessment can improve assessment performance (Clemen, 1999). • Preference assessment - While probability assessments can be evaluated readily, the study of preference and preference assessment techniques, is more problematic (Clemen, 1999). The most popular approach to studying preferences has been to consider the extent to which expressed preferences are internally consistent, as exemplified by the Allais paradox (Allais and Hagen, 1979; Allais, 1953) or by Tversky and Kahneman’s (1981) work on framing (Clemen, 1999). Decision analysis prescribes a number of approaches that are formally equivalent for assessing preference functions (Clemen, 1999). Farquhar (1984) surveys many of the available preference assessment methods. Hershey, Kunreuther and Schoemaker (1982) discuss the biases induced by different preference elicitation approaches in spite of formal equivalence. Fischer (1975) reviews early studies on the validation of multi-attribute assessment. The typical approach has involved what is called “convergent validity”, which is measured in this case by calculating the correlation between the intuitive rankings of the subjects and the rankings produced by the preference function (Clemen, 1999). Although most preference studies have been aimed at understanding and reducing internal inconsistencies, Kimbrough and Weber (1994) describe an experiment with a slightly different orientation. They compared a variety of preference elicitation approaches, each one implemented via a computer program. Some approaches confronted subjects with their inconsistencies and forced them to make modifications; these methods produced recommendations and preference functions that were, by implication, more acceptable to the users (Clemen, 1999). Clearly then the research conducted to date in behavioural decision theory has focussed on the psychology of judgement. Since decision analysis is based on a system of axioms, it has been reasonable to study whether people naturally follow the 28 logic on which decision analysis rests (Clemen, 1999). Studies have shown that they do not. Following such observations, there is a tendency in the decision theory literature for decision analysts and behavioural decision theorists to become embroiled in a somewhat circular argument over the use and benefits of decision analysis (for example, see the exchanges between French and Tocher summarised in French, 1989 pp139-153). Behavioural decision theorists argue that people do not behave in the manner suggested by decision ana...
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This document was uploaded on 03/30/2014.

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