Unformatted text preview: an inﬁnitesmall amount. This will result in a payoﬀ that is approximately:p∗ (1 − p∗ )
p*(1p*),p*(1p*)/2, p*(1p*)/2,...,p*(1p*)/2,1/8, 1/8,...
⇒ p∗ (1 − p∗ ) + p (1−p )δδ) −δ ) + 8δ −δ)
S∗ our second condition is:
p (1−p∗ )(1−δ n )
+ 8(1−δ) > p∗ (1 − p∗ ) + p (1−p )δδ) −δ ) + 8δ −δ)
(1 4 The players in the following game are Alice, who is an MIT senior looking for a job, and
Google. She has also received a wage oﬀer r from Yahoo, but we do not consider Yahoo
as a player. Alice and Google are negotiating. They use alternating oﬀer bargaining, Alice
oﬀering at even dates t = 0, 2, 4, . . . and Google oﬀering at odd dates t = 1, 3, . . .. When
Alice makes an oﬀer w , Google either accepts the oﬀer, by hiring Alice at wage w and ending
the bargaining, or rejects the oﬀer and the negotiation continues. When Google makes an
oﬀer w , Alice
• either accepts the oﬀer...
View Full Document
This document was uploaded on 03/21/2014 for the course ECON 14.12 at MIT.
- Fall '04
- Game Theory