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worlds that are normatively insulated from one another. On this account, the truth-bearers in one world arenot logically related to the truth-bearers in another world (so there cannot be strict disagreement), and yet it isnot possible to embrace both worlds (so they are alternatives). Rovane argues that in the moral domain, butnot in the domain of the natural sciences, there may be different worlds in this sense. Hence, a moraljudgment may be true for the occupant of one world, but not for the occupant of another. An implication ofthis view, she says, is that learning and teaching across different moral worlds might not be possible.In a partially similar view, Velleman (2013) has claimed, on the basis of ethnographic and historical data, thatdifferent communities construct available action types differently. Moreover, reasons for action are alwaysdependent on the perspective of the particular community since they arise out of the drive for mutual
interpretability needed for social life within the community. Hence, there are no perspective-independentreasons. There cannot be straight-forward disagreement across these communities because they do not havecommon sets of action types. The communities may nonetheless address the basic themes of morality, but inincompatible ways given their different perspectives. So moralities can only have local validity.Both Rovane and Velleman stress moral diversity rather than moral disagreement. They maintain, not thatdisagreements cannot be rationally resolved, but that there is no basis for showing that, among variousincompatible alternatives, one is rationally superior to another.In addition, it is worth noting that MMRis sometimes justified by appealing in a significant way to adistinctive analysis of moral judgments in combination with a claim about moral disagreement. For example,Prinz (2007) argues that what he calls “moral sentimentalism” implies a form of MMRonce we acknowledgemoral disagreements. According to moral sentimentalism, an action is morally right (wrong) if and only ifsome observer of the action has a sentiment of approbation (disapprobation) concerning it. Prinz defends thisposition on the basis of a metaethical argument that it is the most plausible account in light of empiricalstudies linking moral judgments and emotions. Since people often have conflicting sentiments about the sameaction, a judgment of the form 'Action Xis right' may be true (when expressed by a person who approves ofX), and 'Xis wrong' may also be true (when expressed by a person who disapproves of X). On this view, thetruth of such moral judgments is relative to the sentiments of the persons who make them. Moralsentimentalism is a crucial feature of this argument and many philosophers would deny that moral rightnessand wrongness depend on our sentiments in this way. But most arguments for MMRare not based on moralsentimentalism.