is. At first, Self’s response is framed in terms of maintaining its prior strategy, perhaps in hopes that the other side is misperceiving the relationship. But Self then begins to shift to a view that the other side is more revisionist than previously thought, e.g. a shift towards a dispositional conclusion about Other. This leads to a reassessment of the wisdom or appropriateness of Self's old strategy, and the rise of voices in support of a more basic shift towards a more coercive strategy. So a security dilemma can start out as a cycle of insecurity between two essentially status quo states but end up changing preferences in less status quo directions. In this regard, security dilemmas are socialization experiences.32 This process also suggests that, contrary to Yan’s logic, relations of enmity are not necessarily more stable than so-called ‘superficial friendship ’33— enmity breeds security dilemma dynamics which are likely to amplify and accentuate malign signalling and malign reactions . Although relations will not zigzag between amity and enmity, the probability of conflict increases exponentially or at least non-linearly. To check whether security dilemma dynamics are increasingly characteristic of the US–China relationship, we need to look for three basic pieces of evidence. First, we need to look for evidence that Self discounts Other’s cooperative behaviour and amplifies Other’s non-cooperative behaviour, such that these behaviours are now interpreted differently from in the past. In contrast, superficial friendship theory might suggest an equal exaggeration of positive (exuberance) and negative (disappointment) information.
Heg Turn..? Their impacts are exaggerated and heg doesn’t solve them Mearshimer and Walt 16’ - JOHN J. MEARSHEIMER is R. Wendell Harrison Distinguished Service Professor of Political Science at the University of Chicago. STEPHEN M. WALT is Robert and Renée Belfer Professor of International Affairs at the Harvard Kennedy School (John and Stephen, “The Case for Offshore Balancing: A Superior U.S. Grand Strategy”, Foreign Affairs, - offshore-balancing//AK ) Defenders of liberal hegemony marshal a number of unpersuasive arguments to make their case. One familiar claim is that only vigorous U.S. leadership can keep order around the globe. But global leadership is not an end in itself; it is desirable only insofar as it benefits the United States directly. One might further argue that U.S. leadership is necessary to overcome the collective-action problem of local actors failing to balance against a potential hegemon. Offshore balancing recognizes this danger, however, and calls for Washington to step in if needed. Nor does it prohibit Washington from giving friendly states in the key regions advice or material aid.
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- Winter '16
- Jeff Hannan
- International Relations, track