This preview has intentionally blurred sections. Sign up to view the full version.View Full Document
Unformatted text preview: 2. Soul: If X's soul is the same as Y's soul, then X and Y are numerically identical. 3. Spatiotemporal continuity: If there is spatiotemporal continuity between X and Y, then X and Y are numerically identical. 4. Psychological continuity: If there is psychological continuity between X and Y, then X and Y are numerically identical. Problems with candidates: 1. Sameness of matter: does not seem to be a sufficient condition for identity • Intuition pump #1: is the professor identical to the roller derby professional? They have nothing in common • Intuition pump #2: Did the teleporter kill you? • Intuition pump #3: Do you have your best friend's body or does your best friend have your character? If the former, then sameness of matter does not seem to be sufficient for personal identity. • Sider: “...[F]or all you know, the matter that now makes up your body once made up the body of another person thousands of years ago...Clearly, that would not make you numerically identical to that statesman. You should not be punished for his crimes...” (10) 2. Souls: Do souls exist? Does not seem sufficient for identity • Suppose that transmigration of soul (reincarnation) is possible. It is possible that Socrates' soul is in someone else's body. Suppose that that body is my body. Am I Socrates? I have none of his memories, nor of his character traits, none of his knowledge 3. Spatiotemporal continuity: First problem – is it sufficient for personal identity? • “suppose that you are captured, put into a pot, and melted into soup, (Sider 13). • Refinement: “Persons are numerically identical if and only if they are spatiotemporally continuous via a series of persons.” (13) ◦ Intuition pump #1: The professor and the roller derby professional are spatiotemporally continuous. Are they numerically identical? • The prince and the cobbler example – John Locke ◦ Who is who? It seems reasonable to claim that the prince is now in the cobbler's body, whereas the cobbler is in the prince's body ◦ If you are convinced by this thought experiment, then spatiotemporal continuity does not suffice for personal identity. 4. Psychological continuity: What does the term psychological continuity mean? X is psychologically continuous to Y is X has (some of) Y's memories, character traits, dispositions • Branching ◦ Suppose that there is a machine that can copy the psychology of a person and then transport that psychology into someone else's mind. ◦ So suppose person B can be made to have person A's psychology. But if psychological continuity suffices for personal identity then person B is numerically identical to person A. ▪ Problem: they are one in the same, but occupy different spatiotemporal location....
View Full Document
- Fall '10
- Turing, intuition pump