6 Adaptability and the willingness to learn and implement necessary reforms In

6 adaptability and the willingness to learn and

This preview shows page 6 - 7 out of 7 pages.

6. Adaptability and the willingness to learn and implement necessary reforms.In a good safety culture, hazard identification is proactive. When humans operate in fear of punishment for normal mistakes, errors and unsafe actions will remain hidden, and opportunities for improvement and prevention will be lost. Proactive hazard identification processes will provide a continuous commitment to safety. It is necessary for the managementto provide these processes with adequate resources to systematically record and store, and competently analyze data on identified hazards.Employees can voluntarily report safety information that may be critical to identifying potential precursors to accidents. Reports are then collected, analyzed and retained. Findings are resolved through corrective action rather than punishment or discipline. This requires a culture and process where employees can easily make these reports, with no fear of reprisal.Near miss reporting is also an important indication of safety culture. "Near miss” or “near hit” refers to any unplanned event that has the potential to incur loss, injury, or damage, but didn’t. An organization that not only tracks near misses but examines how and why they occur can prevent future incidents through the use of corrective actions. With enough commitment to such a system, an organization can foster a culture that promotes, pursues, and praises proactive efforts such as near miss tracking.Explain and discuss the dynamics associated with analyzing and assessing commercial aviation accident statistics.Statistics are presented in the aviation industry as a summary of aviation accidents for a particular year. Under federal regulations, it is mandatory for statistical data to be recorded
Background image
over a period of time, typically within the span of five to ten years. These statistics are generated in the efforts of increasing the overall safety of aviation. However, aviation statistics have caused controversies in the way the statistics are being manipulated to make things seem better or worse than they actually are. Often, airlines and aviation companies would manipulate the data presented to appeal in their favor. Unfortunately, there are clear constraints when analyzing and comparing aviation accident statistics. Aviation accidents cannot be compared to other forms of accidents. Similarly, the statistics differ between general aviation accidents and major airline accidents and cannot be compared to each other. Major airlines have higher rates of aircraft operations that include departures and landings which are considered to be the most critical conditions of flight. Furthermore, the operations of general aviation and major airlines set different requirements. FAA Part 121 airline operations possess requirements that are stricter as compared to FAA Part 135 or Part 61. This is due to the environment in which flights are conducted. For example, the FAA Part 121 is applied to airlines that mostly operate bigger aircraft with morepassengers and cargo. The FAA Part 61, on the other hand, is applied to private aircraft operations with lesser passengers and cargo. Hence, comparing the statistics of general aviation accidents and major airline accidents would generate inaccurate results due to the different requirements and nature of operations.
Background image

  • Left Quote Icon

    Student Picture

  • Left Quote Icon

    Student Picture

  • Left Quote Icon

    Student Picture